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ABSTRACT 
 The Southern Philippines has remained embroiled in insurgency for nearly 50 
years. This thesis traces the insurgency through three distinct phases: the first two phases 
represent an ethno-nationalist insurgency, and the latest phase results from a qualitative 
shift toward a Pan-Islamic insurgency. While the Philippine government successfully 
ended the first two phases, the third phase of insurgency is composed of disparate groups 
that are linked to global jihadist organizations. Using a comparative study of Russia’s 
counterinsurgency efforts in Chechnya, this thesis examines why the Philippine 
government has not yet successfully ended the decades-long insurgency. The Philippine 
and Chechen cases have numerous similarities, showing a comparable pattern of 
insurgency. However, the two countries waged drastically different counterinsurgency 
campaigns, and the two cases have divergent outcomes. 
 This thesis finds that Russia’s “Chechenization” strategy, which decentralized the 
counterinsurgency and pushed counterinsurgency functions down to the local level, was 
the cornerstone of its success. In the Philippines, counterinsurgency efforts have 
remained mostly centralized under the armed forces of the Philippines, with no serious 
effort made to localize them. This suggests that the Philippines may need to consider 
employing a localization strategy in order to defeat the current insurgency. 
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For nearly 50 years, the Philippines has waged a counterinsurgency against Muslim 
militants in the southern portion of the country. Although the Philippines has experienced 
periods of success in its efforts, including a peace agreement with the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM),1 it has thus far failed to end the insurgency. 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This section identifies the research question, its significance, and provides a 
roadmap of the thesis, outlining the overall structure and the main content of each chapter. 
 Research Question 
This thesis addresses the following as the primary research question: Why have 
government counterinsurgency efforts failed to end the insurgency in the Southern 
Philippines? Thus, far, critical analyses of the counterinsurgency in Mindanao from a 
“whole of government” perspective are scarce. Furthermore, much of the academic 
research attempting to answer this question is outdated. The thesis examines this question 
by conducting a comparative study of the Philippine counterinsurgency from the 1970s 
until the present with the Russia’s counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya from 1995–
2009.  
In order to answer the primary research question, research for this thesis focuses of 
on questions that cumulatively tie into the main question. First, how is counterinsurgency 
success defined? Once a definition is established, a logical question is whether the 
Mindanao counterinsurgency has been successful or unsuccessful. Was Russia’s 
counterinsurgency in Chechnya successful? If successful, why? If unsuccessful, why not? 
After these questions are suitably answered, the next logical questions are comparative. 
What are the similarities between the way Russia and the Philippines conducted 
                                                 
1 Zachary Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and 
Reconciliation, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 70–74. 
 2 
counterinsurgency operations? What are the differences? Finally, can these differences 
shed light on the reasons for the Philippines’ failure to end the southern insurgency? 
 Significance of the Research Question 
As a strategic ally of the United States, the security and stability of the Philippines 
align closely with U.S. national interests. The most recent National Security Strategy 
document describes the importance to U.S. strategy of the Asian region in general and the 
Philippines in particular.2 In 2016, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter further 
cemented the status of the Philippines as a strategic U.S. partner, announcing the “need to 
further enhance [the] security partnership” between the two countries.3  
Counterinsurgency has been the focus of U.S. combat operations for the last 14 
years, with massive counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighting the 
importance of this role in the U.S. military and the importance of counterinsurgency 
expertise within the U.S. government. Today, counterinsurgency remains one of the 
military’s core missions.4 However, the relevance of counterinsurgency study is not limited 
to the military. The U.S. “whole of government” approach to counterinsurgency recognizes 
the subordinate role of the military and the criticality of cooperative efforts between 
civilian and military entities.5 
The U.S. has provided support to the Philippines for their counterinsurgency efforts 
and maintained a troop presence within the Philippines since 2001.6 The U.S.’s active 
                                                 
2 The White House, National Security Strategy, February 2015, 24, http://nssarchive.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. 
3 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Secretary Gazmin in 
Manila, Philippines,” April 14, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/721687/joint-press-conference-by-secretary-carter-and-secretary-gazmin-in-manila-phili/. 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: The United 
States Military’s Contribution to National Security (June 2015), 11, 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf. 
5 “Whole of government” approach to counterinsurgency refers to the military and nonmilitary means 
by which the counterinsurgency is conducted. This includes security operations, the political strategy, 
economic development, control, etc. Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide 
(Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 2009), 14–16, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. 
6 Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the 
Philippines, 2001–2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 17–19. 
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involvement, albeit in a support role, in the Philippine counterinsurgency makes this thesis 
a relevant and useful study. The proposed research question deals with both a location of 
strategic interest—the Philippines—and a subject of national security and military 
relevance—counterinsurgency.  
 Thesis Roadmap 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. The opening chapter introduces the thesis, 
stating the research question, providing an overview of the argument, and reviewing the 
relevant literature. The second chapter gives the foundation for the comparative study by 
providing the definitions and pertinent counterinsurgency concepts that are necessary for 
an analytic framework. This chapter also explains why Chechnya makes a good 
comparative study for analysis alongside the Philippines, highlighting the similar 
characteristics of the insurgencies in the two locations and also pointing out the key 
differences. The third chapter contains the case study of the Philippines’ Mindanao 
counterinsurgency. It covers the historical facts relevant to the case study and analyzes the 
effectiveness of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency methods, specifically delving into the 
successes and failures of the Philippine government to end the insurgency in the South. 
The fourth chapter conducts a similar case study of Russia’s Chechen counterinsurgency. 
The fifth chapter contains the comparative analysis of the two counterinsurgencies 
examined in the previous chapters. This chapter analyzes the areas in which the Russian 
and Philippine governments took similar approaches in their respective counterinsurgency 
strategies and the areas in which they diverged, extracting usable evidence against which 
the explanatory hypotheses are tested and leading to the answer to the research question.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Modern counterinsurgency theory draws extensively on case studies and academic 
analysis of various counterinsurgency campaigns to establish propositions for what makes 
a successful counterinsurgency. Kilcullen, one of the major contributors to U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine, identifies two fundamental principles for successful 
 4 
counterinsurgency warfare. The first is finding local solutions.7 This involves 
understanding the situation at a local level and using local allies and partnerships for 
“locally tailored measures.”8 Although Kilcullen primarily describes this fundamental at 
the tactical level, it can be extrapolated to a broader sense to mean turning as much of the 
counterinsurgency fight as possible over to local entities for execution, provided that the 
local forces have a required level of competence.9 
The second fundamental of counterinsurgency is respect for noncombatants. This 
is the core of population-centric counterinsurgency10 and involves protecting the local 
populace, even potentially at the expense of killing the enemy.11 This approach recognizes 
the counter-productivity of noncombatant casualties and considers a population that feels 
safe to be “one of the keys to operational success.”12 
At the strategic and operational levels of counterinsurgency warfare, U.S. doctrine 
gives two overarching principles essential for success. The first is the primacy of non-
military means: military efforts should be nested within an integrated strategy. The U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide states, “In counterinsurgency, military forces are, 
in a sense, an enabling system for civil administration; their role is to afford sufficient 
protection and stability to allow the government to work safely with its population, for 
economic revival, political reconciliation and external non-government assistance to be 
effective.”13 Schaefer expands upon this principle, positing that “insurgencies are first and 
foremost a political struggle, and therefore the military should never be the primary agency 
                                                 
7 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3–4. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Yoav Gortzak, “Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 
1954–1962,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009): 328–332. 
10 Population-centric counterinsurgency “assumes that the center of gravity is the government’s 
relationship with and support among the population.” Department of State, U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide, 14. 
11 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 4. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 15. 
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for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign.”14 Second, a successful counterinsurgency 
requires coordinated, unified efforts among all stakeholders.15 This applies between the 
military and civilian agencies as well as among different government agencies. 
Two additional principles are pervasive throughout the counterinsurgency 
literature. First, counterinsurgency success depends upon the legitimacy of government in 
the contested area. Insurgents strive to establish their own legitimacy while degrading the 
legitimacy of the established government; therefore, counterinsurgency strategy must 
include efforts to boost the legitimacy of the local government.16  Second, 
counterinsurgency campaigns require adequate resources for success.17 This would seem 
to be an obvious point on the surface. However, counterinsurgencies usually require a 
massive amount of civilian and military resources, and many times governments are 
unwilling or unable to provide sufficient resources. 
Explanations for the failure of the Philippines to end the insurgency in the South 
despite nearly five decades of efforts generally follow one of two different threads. The 
first thread deals with Philippine politics and the repeated failure of the country to reach a 
peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest insurgent 
group in the South. Abuza documents years of attempts and failures between the Philippine 
government and the MILF to achieve a peace agreement. Although a peace deal framework 
was agreed upon by the MILF and the administration of President Aquino in 2012,18 a 
series of political obstacles kept the agreement from being passed by the legislature. The 
Philippine government still has not adopted the peace agreement, and its future remains 
uncertain. Abuza posits that this peace agreement holds the key to ending the insurgency, 
                                                 
14 Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 9–10. 
15 Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 15–16. 
16 This proposition is put forward by Schaefer in The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus, by Gompert and Gordon in, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities 
for Counterinsurgency, and by Davidson in “Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution 
and Debate” among many others. 
17 Examples of literature espousing this concept are Petraeus in The U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Davidson in “Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency,” and 
Ucko and Egnell in Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare. 
18 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 87. 
 6 
stating that the failed agreement brought the region “so close to a durable and lasting peace” 
and that “it had the power to bring peace and prosperity to the poorest part of a poor 
country.”19 
A second analytical thread focuses on the military aspects of the counterinsurgency 
campaign. Literature taking this approach usually examines certain portions, battles, or eras 
of the counterinsurgency, looking at the military successes and failures from a tactical 
standpoint. Pobre and Quilop analyze the Philippine army’s 2000 operation against the 
MILF, conducted after President Estrada shifted the country’s counterinsurgency focus 
from the communist insurgency to the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao and ordered an 
intensive military campaign against the MILF.20 Although this campaign was part of a 
civil-military counterinsurgency effort that included development plans in addition to 
military force, Pobre and Quilop concentrate their analysis on the tactical successes and 
failures of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police 
(PNP). The identify several military shortcomings during this campaign, including a 
misidentified enemy center of gravity, failure to obtain timely and useful intelligence, and 
poor messaging which degraded public relations.21  
The Russian counterinsurgency in Chechnya provides an excellent opportunity for 
comparative study with the Philippine case due to key similarities. These similarities will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter II. In addition to the similarities, a key contrast makes 
Chechnya an excellent case for comparison: The Chechen counterinsurgency officially 
ended in 2009 while the Philippine counterinsurgency is ongoing. 
Even in literature that largely provides historical narrative of the Chechen 
insurgency and Russia’s response, analyses of the outcome generally follow one of two 
disparate positions. Russia’s counterinsurgency campaign took place in two distinct 
periods characterized by major military operations. The first period, also called the First 
                                                 
19 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 110–111. 
20 Cesar P. Pobre and Raymund Jose G. Quilop, In Assertion of Sovereignty Volume One: The 2000 
Campaign against the MILF (Quezon City, Philippines: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of 
Strategic and Special Studies, 2008), 30–33. 
21 Ibid., 126–130. 
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Chechen War, began in 1994 and ended in 1996.22 The second period began in 1999 and 
lasted ten years, ending with a Russian declaration of victory in 2009.23 The position 
regarding the outcome of the conflict that can be considered “conventional wisdom” holds 
that Russia inadequately dealt with the insurgency in the first war, but successfully quelled 
the Chechen insurgency by the end of the second war. This position is based upon the fact 
that Russia withdrew its forces from Chechnya with a declaration of victory and rendered 
the guerilla war fought by Chechen insurgents “all but over.”24 Dannreuther and March 
echo this position, stating, “Russian policies towards Chechnya have succeeded, far more 
than is generally acknowledged outside Russia, in many of their aims. The republic is now 
relatively calm, is gradually being rebuilt, and is a loyal member of the Russian 
Federation.”25 Most adherents of this position acknowledge that some of the underlying 
problems that lead to the Chechen insurgency still remain and that the potential for future 
conflict exists, with Galeotti stating that “while Chechnya may now largely be pacified, the 
rest of the North Caucasus is experiencing rising local nationalist and jihadist insurgency, 
which could yet blow back into Chechnya.”26 
A contrasting position contends that while Russia achieved military success and 
temporary political success in Chechnya by 2009, it has failed to achieve overall 
counterinsurgency success, and an insurgency remains festering within Chechen society, 
waiting for the right moment to resurface. Schaefer represents this view, stating, “The 
bottom line is that the Chechen insurgency is growing and has now spread to Ingushetia 
and Dagestan, among others. It is more accurately referred to now as the North Caucasus 
insurgency.”27 He contends that the apparent success of Russian efforts against Chechen 
insurgents does not signify a successful counterinsurgency effort, but rather a transition of 
                                                 
22 Mark Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009 (Oxford: Osprey, 2014), 7. 
23 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 79. 
24 Ibid., 85. 
25 Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, “Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?” Survival 50, no. 4 (September 
1, 2008): 107. 
26 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 91. 
27 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 7. 
 8 
Chechen insurgents from a phase of overt violence to an underground phase focused on 
building support.28  
Literature that takes the position that Russia conducted a successful 
counterinsurgency in Chechnya generally identifies “Chechenization” of the conflict as the 
primary causal factor leading to success.29 This term as applied to counterinsurgency 
success has two facets. In a military sense, Russia recognized its shortcomings in the first 
Chechen war and adapted in the second war by recruiting Chechens to fight the insurgents, 
recognizing that Chechens were best suited to conduct the counterinsurgency.30 In a 
political sense, this term refers to Russia “co-opting (buying off) Chechen leaders and 
ultimately transferring the conflict from Russian to Chechen hands,”31 the most prominent 
case of which is Russia’s installation of a Chechen president who is loyal to the Kremlin 
but still enjoys some degree of legitimacy with the Chechen people.32 
On the other hand, the contrary view holds that Russia, by using brutal and 
repressive tactics to pacify Chechnya, has failed to win the hearts and minds of the people 
and has neglected to address the root causes that made insurgency possible, rendering it 
only a matter of time before the insurgency regroups.33  
A review of the pertinent literature shows varying views regarding explanations for 
the extended insurgency in the Southern Philippines despite decades of counterinsurgency 
                                                 
28 In counterinsurgency theory, a Phase I insurgency is the “latent and incipient stage” in which the 
insurgency remains largely underground and focused on recruiting, training, and garnering support rather 
than overt violence. A Phase II insurgency is the guerilla warfare stage, in which the insurgency is 
characterized by “low-level violence such as sabotage, subversion, and terrorism while constantly 
attempting to mobilize the masses through propaganda.” Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the 
North Caucasus, 24–25. 
29 Examples of authors propagating this view are Mark Galeotti in Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–
2009, Jean-Francois Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov in “A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense 
of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation,” and Miriam Matejova in “ Russian ‘Chechenization’ and the 
Prospects for a Lasting Peace in Chechnya.” 
30 Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense 
of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 8 (2016): 1297–1299. 
31 Miriam Matejova “Russian ‘Chechenization’ and the Prospects for a Lasting Peace in Chechnya,” 
International Journal on World Peace 30, no. 2 (2013): 9. 
32 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 84. 
33 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 274–277. 
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efforts and also reveals a scholarly gap. Very little critical analysis of the Mindanao 
counterinsurgency has been performed looking at the counterinsurgency campaign from a 
whole of government standpoint, covering the political, civil, and military aspects. This 
thesis explores this knowledge gap.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis offers four hypotheses as potential answers to the research question. The 
first potential explanation deals with resource commitment, hypothesizing that 
counterinsurgency campaigns have failed to dedicate adequate resources to those efforts. 
During much of the time period covered by this thesis, countering the Muslim insurgency 
in the South remained a secondary priority behind either countering a communist 
insurgency that was considered to be a closer and more immediate threat to national 
security or focusing on external threats such as an increasingly assertive China in the South 
China Sea. These factors and this prioritization have prevented the Philippines from 
providing the military and government resources necessary for a successful 
counterinsurgency. 
A second hypothesis attributes the failure of the counterinsurgency campaign to 
political factors. The Philippine government has had multiple opportunities to make lasting 
peace agreements with the main insurgent groups and has offered deals that the insurgent 
groups found acceptable, yet has repeatedly failed to enact those deals into law or uphold 
the government’s part of the agreement. Presumably, due to the relatively contained nature 
of the insurgency within the country, the majority of the Philippine citizens are not directly 
affected by the conflict, leading to a domestic political situation in which the political 
support necessary to reach a peace agreement has been unattainable—despite the tactical 
successes of counterinsurgency forces.  
A third hypothesis suggests that counterinsurgency efforts have failed because the 
government lacked a coherent counterinsurgency strategy. This hypothesis surmises that 
the absence of an overall strategy has resulted in disconnected efforts between the military 
and other government agencies. This disconnect has hampered efforts at all levels and 
prevented tactical successes from achieving strategic objectives.  
 10 
A fourth hypothesis explains the lack of counterinsurgency success in terms of 
over-centralizing management of the conflict at the expense of localization. This 
explanation presumes that the Philippine government has not effectively localized 
counterinsurgency efforts. The central government has played too strong a role in the 
counterinsurgency and has not followed a “Chechenization” model such as brought Russia 
success in Chechnya.   
 11 
II. STUDYING COUNTERINSURGENCIES 
A. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
Because the terms “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” are often incorrectly 
conflated with “terrorism” and “counterterrorism” or otherwise misused, clear definitions 
are required for a study of this subject. This thesis uses definitions of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency from joint U.S. military doctrine. Joint Publication (JP) 3–14, 
Counterinsurgency defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to 
seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the 
group itself.”34 JP 3–14 defines counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root 
causes.”35 JP 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by 
religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or 
societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political”36 and defines counterterrorism as 
“activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks 
in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce  governments 
or societies to achieve their goals.”37 Therefore, while insurgent groups may use terrorism 
to further their goals, “insurgency” and “terrorism” have distinct meanings. Using the 
above definitions, the militant groups in both Chechnya and Mindanao during the period 
of study for this thesis fall firmly under the “insurgent” label. In addition, as will be clearly 
shown in the case study chapters, campaigns waged by both the Russian and Philippine 
governments in response to their respective militant groups may be accurately considered 
“counterinsurgencies.” 
                                                 
34 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–24: Counterinsurgency, November 2013, G-5, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, February 2016, 241, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf. 
37 Ibid., 54. 
 12 
Equally important to defining counterinsurgency, yet significantly more difficult, 
is clearly defining counterinsurgency success. Unlike more conventional conflicts or major 
wars, counterinsurgencies are rarely ended with a formal surrender, peace accords, or 
armistice agreements. As such, finding a clear line of delineation between 
counterinsurgency success and failure and even finding good counterinsurgency 
performance metrics can prove challenging. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Michael Mullen captured the difficulty of identifying counterinsurgency success, 
stating, “success in these types of [counterinsurgency] wars is iterative, not 
decisive…Quite frankly, it will feel a lot less like a knockout punch and a lot more like 
recovering from a long illness.”38  Given the general lack of a clear-cut end to 
counterinsurgencies, it is unsurprising that many counterinsurgency operations conclude 
with controversy over whether or not they were successful.  
Although defining counterinsurgency success may not eliminate all controversy, 
doing so provides an analytical basis for conducting counterinsurgency case studies. This 
thesis defines counterinsurgency success by drawing on the U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide, which describes success as the “marginalization of the 
insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted or reduced to irrelevance in 
numbers and capability.”39 Using this definition, the success or failure of 
counterinsurgency efforts will be determined by the state and capability of an insurgency 
at a given point in time and the presence or lack of a subsequent period of peace, without 
regard to speculation about whether or not an insurgency may spring up in later 
generations. If an insurgency has been rendered ineffective, and if the future carries a 
reasonable expectation of peace, the counterinsurgency effort will be considered 
successful. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the above criteria lead this thesis 
to characterize Russia’s Chechen counterinsurgency as successful and the Philippines’ 
Mindanao counterinsurgency as unsuccessful thus far.  
                                                 
38 Michael Mullen, Landon Lecture, March 3, 2010, https://www.k-state.edu/landon/speakers/michael-
mullen/transcript.html. 
39 Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 4. 
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B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Counterinsurgencies are inherently complex endeavors; therefore, determining the 
reasons for success or failure of a counterinsurgency can be difficult. Often, evidence can 
be interpreted in multiple ways, and the number of variables can make identification of 
causal mechanisms a challenge. Because of this complexity, the most appropriate analytical 
approach for this thesis is to conduct a comparative case study, allowing the researcher to 
draw cause and effect inferences from patterns found across multiple conflicts. This thesis 
draws upon evidence from the Chechnya case in order to compare with the Philippine case 
and determine such patterns.  
For a comparative study to be useful, the cases must be similar enough to enable 
the identification of patterns. However, analysis must also take into account differences 
between cases in order to avoid faulty inferences. 
 Key Similarities 
Despite Chechnya and Mindanao being located in different regions of the world—
with the Philippine island of Mindanao located in Southeast Asia and Chechnya located in 
the North Caucasus region of Eastern Europe—a number of striking similarities in the 
respective insurgencies of those two areas make them well-suited for a comparative 
counterinsurgency study. First of all, insurgencies in both Chechnya and the Philippines40 
are confined to a specific geographic area within the respective countries. Mindanao, the 
second largest Philippine island,41 is located in the far south of the Philippine archipelago, 
as depicted in Figure 1. The Chechen Republic, generally referred to as Chechnya, occupies 
a position in the southwest corner of the Russian Federation, as shown in Figure 2. 
                                                 
40 The insurgency referenced here specifically refers to the Muslim insurgency in the Southern 
Philippines. The long-standing communist insurgency has historically affected a greater portion of the 
Philippines.   




Figure 1.  Map of the Philippines.42 
                                                 




Figure 2.  Map of the Russia Federation depicting Chechnya.43 
Both insurgencies have religious underpinnings, with Islam as the predominant 
religious driver. Writing of the Chechen insurgency, Schaefer states, “From [the late 
eighteenth century] forward every Chechen insurgency movement (rebellion/insurrection) 
would be fueled, at least in part, by the ideology of conservative and fundamentalist Islam, 
and was accompanied by a call for a more stringent interpretation of Islamic Sacred Texts 
and law.”44 Likewise, Islam has played a significant role in insurgent movements and 
uprisings in Mindanao throughout modern history.45 
The roots of both insurgencies can be traced back several hundred years, with a 
resurgence of conflict being initiated in the latter half of the twentieth century. The first 
clash between Russia and Chechen insurgents began in 1784.46 The conflict studied by this 
                                                 
43 Adapted from Alexander Chubarov, web image, accessed April 17, 2018, 
http://www.allrussias.com/images/bullet-Map_of_Russia_-_Chechen_Republic_(2008-03)_svg.png. 
44 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 56. 
45 Naoyuki Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace Through Development,” Asia-
Pacific Review 23, no. 2 (2016): 37–39. 
46 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 12–21. 
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thesis began in 1994. In Mindanao and the nearby islands, clashes between Moros47 and 
Spanish forces seeking to subdue the region began in 1578 during the Spanish occupation 
of the Philippines.48 The modern insurgency commenced in 1972 with the armed rebellion 
of the MNLF.49 
Conflicts in both Mindanao and Chechnya began as a quest for territorial autonomy 
and/or independence, and both were later influenced to some extent by actors attempting 
to turn the conflict into part of a greater global jihad. Bodansky details how, in the 1990s, 
Islamists in Chechnya began attempting to coopt the insurgency in the name of global 
jihad.50 In the Southern Philippines during the 1990s, Fowler describes how splinter groups 
with ties to transnational jihadist organizations broke off from what was largely an ethno-
nationalist insurgency, transforming the insurgency into one with Islamist objectives that 
went beyond mere territorial autonomy.51 
The location of both insurgencies fell within economically depressed areas of their 
respective countries. Abuza refers to Mindanao as “the poorest part of a relatively poor 
country,”52 and regarding Chechnya, Matejova writes that “the economic and social 
situation appears to be grim.”53  
The terrain in both Chechnya and Mindanao favors insurgents and poses a 
significant military obstacle to counterinsurgency forces. Much of Chechnya is 
mountainous and thickly forested, creating an environment that Galeotti refers to as 
                                                 
47 The term “Moro” encompasses all the various Muslim tribes in the Southern Philippines. The use of 
this term goes back to the Spanish colonial era, when the Spanish named the Muslims in that region 
“Moors,” from which the word Moro is derived. Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 65. 
48 James R. Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine 
Jungle, 1902–1913 (New York, Bloomsberry Press: 2013), 5. 
49 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 69. 
50 Yossef Bodansky, Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2007), 32–43. 
51 Mike Fowler, “Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now” Small Wars Journal 
(January 18, 2011), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/651-fowler.pdf. 
52 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 69. 
53 Matejova, “Russian ‘Chechenization’ and the Prospects for a Lasting Peace in Chechnya,” 15. 
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“perfect bandit and guerilla country.”54 Rugged jungle characterizes Mindanao and the rest 
of the Southern Philippines, causing significant challenges for military forces and making 
counterinsurgency operations difficult.55  
Finally, insurgent groups in both cases received limited but notable support from 
outside actors. In the 1990s, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan sent fighters and provided 
financial support to the Chechen insurgency.56 Chechen insurgents also received support, 
most notably in the form of foreign fighters, from the Al Qaeda organization.57 Libya 
openly supported the Moro insurgency in the 1970s, “providing significant training and 
arms to the MNLF.”58 Moro rebels also obtained support from the Malaysian state of 
Sabah’s governor, who provided both arms and sanctuary.59 In more recent times, the 
MILF received training from Al Qaeda terrorists.60 
 Key Differences 
Although the similarities in the Philippine and Chechen cases provide an excellent 
opportunity for a comparative study, no two case are exactly alike. These cases do have 
some important differences that must be recognized. Foremost is the contrast between 
Chechnya and Mindanao in both size and scale. Mindanao is about five times the size of 
Chechnya, with a land area of roughly 37,000 square miles61 to Chechnya’s roughly 7,500 
square miles.62 Figure 3 graphically depicts the land area difference between the two. 
Mindanao also represents a far larger portion of the Philippines than Chechnya does to the 
Russian Federation (see Figures 1 and 2). From 2015 census figures, Mindanao has a 
                                                 
54 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 7. 
55 Preeti Bhattacharji, “Terrorism Havens: Philippines,” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder 
(2009). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-philippines. 
56 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 77. 
57 Bodansky, Chechen Jihad, 41. 
58 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 69–77. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Encyclopedia Brittanica, “Mindanao,” https://www.britannica.com/place/Mindanao. 
62 New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Chechnya,” accessed May 7, 2018, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Chechnya. 
 18 
population of about 24 million,63 and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) has a population of about 3.8 million.64 Chechnya’s 2015 population stood at 1.4 
million.65 
 
The shaded area represents Chechnya, superimposed over the island of Mindanao for 
comparative purposes. 
Figure 3.  Size comparison of Mindanao and Chechnya.66 
Unsurprisingly, Russia has far more military capability, in both size and 
technology, than the Philippines. In 2015, Russia’s total armed forces numbered nearly 1.5 
million, while the Philippines’ armed forces totaled 165,500.67 Equally disparate between 
                                                 
63 Philippine Statistics Authority, “Philippine Population Surpassed the 100 Million Mark (Results 
from the 2015 Census of Population),” June 30, 2017, https://psa.gov.ph/population-and-housing. 
64 Philippine Statistics Authority, “Population of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Based 
on the 2015 Census of Population),” June 10, 2016, https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-autonomous-
region-muslim-mindanao-based-2015-census-population. 
65 Liz Fuller, “Is Chechnya Facing Demographic Decline?” Caucasus Report, July 11, 2016, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-chechnya-declining-birth-rate/27852489.html. 
66 Adapted from Sunflower Education, Web-based Mapping Tool, www.overlapmaps.com. 
67 World Bank, “Armed Forces Personnel, Total,” 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1. 
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the two countries is total military spending, with Russia’s 2015 military expenditures 
totaling nearly $35 billion compared to less than $4 billion for the Philippines.68 
The ethnic composition of Chechnya and Mindanao provides another important 
difference. Chechnya’s ethnic makeup is relatively homogenous, and Twigg states that 
“Chechnya is [Russia’s] Muslim region with the strongest degree of homogeneity, with 
93.47% of its population ethnic Chechen.”69 By contrast, the Moros in the Southern 
Philippines are a diverse people, with Abuza pointing out that the Moros have “three major 
linguistic and ten minor linguistic groups along with distinct ethnic differences.”70 The 
Maranaos, the Tausugs, and the Maguindanaons comprise the main ethnic groups.71 
C. CONCLUSION 
In order to effectively study causal factors of success or failure in the Mindanao 
counterinsurgency, this thesis uses the comparative study method, with the Chechen 
counterinsurgency selected as the comparison case. Insurgencies in both Chechnya and 
Mindanao take place in specific territories within Russia and the Philippines. 
Counterinsurgency forces in both locations face geographic obstacles, with terrain that is 
favorable to guerilla forces. Both insurgencies can be traced to conflicts originating 
centuries ago, and both have Islamic underpinnings. Both follow a similar pattern of 
beginning as a quest for independence or autonomy, and later, through outside support 
from foreign elements, being infused with actors attempting to transform the insurgencies 
into part of the global jihad.  
The Philippine and Chechen cases do have notable differences that must be taken 
into account for an accurate analysis. Mindanao is significantly bigger, takes up a much 
larger portion of its parent country, and is more populous than Chechnya. Russia has far 
more military resources with which it may employ in counterinsurgency efforts. Unlike 
                                                 
68 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
69 Judyth Twigg, “Differential Demographics: Russia’s Muslim and Slavic Populations,” PONARS 
Policy Memo No. 388 (December 2005), 133–140. 
70 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 65. 
71 Ibid., 66. 
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Chechnya, which is largely ethnically homogenous, Mindanao is ethnically and 
linguistically diverse, posing unique counterinsurgency challenges. 
Despite the differences described above, the two cases show many similar patterns. 
Most importantly, the two cases have different outcomes, making them ideal for 
comparative analysis of causal factors.  
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III. PHILIPPINES CASE STUDY 
This thesis examines the Philippines’ counterinsurgency in Mindanao and the 
nearby Sulu Archipelago as an effort against a greater Moro insurgency, rather than solely 
focusing on actions against an individual insurgent organization. Although the insurgency 
manifests itself in the form of named organizations, these organizations, while disparate, 
comprise a greater insurgency, whereby the elimination of a single insurgent group would 
not result in the elimination of the insurgency or in overall counterinsurgency success. The 
modern insurgency can be divided into three distinct periods. The Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) dominated the first period, which was 1972–1996. The second 
period, 1996–2012, was dominated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which 
broke away from the MNLF. The third period, 2012 to the present, saw the rise of a number 
of groups, many of which splintered out of the MNLF or MILF. The insurgency of this 
period was qualitatively different from that of previous periods in that, whereas the MNLF 
and MILF’s objectives were independence or autonomy, the newer insurgent groups are 
linked to the global jihad and have aspirations of a Pan-Islamic state. 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Although this thesis focuses on the insurgency that began in the 1970s, the current 
conflict in Mindanao is the latest iteration of a series of conflicts that go back hundreds of 
years. This section discusses the historical events that precipitated the modern insurgency 
and studies the modern insurgency from the beginning of conflict in 1972 until the present. 
 Background of the Conflict/Roots of Insurgency 
The roots of the Moro insurgency can be traced back to the sixteenth century, when 
Spanish conquistadors attempted to extend their colonial rule of the Philippines to the 
island of Mindanao. Conflict between Spain and the Muslims of the Southern Philippines 
began in the 1560s.72 Having conquered Luzon and the Visayas—the northern and central 
                                                 
72 Steven Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf: The Lessons of Failure in the Philippines,” Foreign 
Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 16. 
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islands of the Philippines—and found success in Christianizing the populations of those 
islands, Spain set its sights upon the Southern Philippines, seeking to conquer and 
Christianize the Muslims of Mindanao and the Sulu Islands.73 The Spanish met with fierce 
resistance. Although the Muslims of the Southern Philippines were composed of a diverse 
set of tribes and ethnicities and had no unified state,74 the invasion of the Spanish brought 
them loosely together against a common enemy.75 Spain found the Muslims so resistant to 
missionary efforts that the Spanish placed the Muslims of Mindanao in a different category 
from the rest of the Filipinos, labelling them “Moros” after the Muslim Moors of Spain.76 
Conflict between Spain and the Moros lasted for over 300 years and wreaked 
devastating havoc upon the Moro communities.77 Spain never managed to fully conquer 
the Moros, whose struggle against their would-be colonizers has been called “one of the 
most remarkable resistances in the annals of military history.”78 However, as one result of 
the protracted conflict, Arnold points out that “Moro society largely developed in isolation 
from the rest of the Philippines,”79 creating a rift in Philippine society that would have 
implications far into the future. 
The United States assumed control of the Philippines in 1898 following the 
Spanish-American War. Although the United States, in contrast to Spain, did not attempt 
to Christianize the Moros,80 the Moros still fiercely resisted American rule, sparking a 
bloody guerilla war between American forces and the Moros that lasted from 1902–1913.81 
                                                 
73 Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict,” 38. 
74 Various Sultanates in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands gained a great deal of power, but none of them 
was able to unify all the Muslims.  
75 Arnold, The Moro War, 5–6. 
76 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 50. 
77 Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict,” 38. 
78 Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros (Salem, OR: Cerberus Books, 2010), 16. 
79 Arnold, The Moro War, 6. 
80 Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict,” 38.  
81 Robert A. Fulton, Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros 1899–1920 (Bend, OR: 
Tumalo Creek Press, 2016), 4–6. 
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The U.S. counterinsurgency campaign succeeded in pacifying the Moros,82 and a period of 
relative peace ensued in Mindanao for nearly a half century. However, the United States, 
during its period of rule, governed Mindanao as a separate entity from the remainder of the 
Philippines,83 continuing the pattern of a divided Philippine society. 
The U.S. established the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935 as a precursor 
to full Philippine independence, and an indigenous government began to replace the 
territorial government of the United States.84 Rather than heal the divide between the 
Moros and the rest of the Filipinos, the Commonwealth government took actions that 
served to deepen the rift. President Quezon implemented policies intended to transplant 
Filipinos from the Northern Philippines to Mindanao, resulting in a massive influx of 
Christians into areas previously dominated by Muslims.85 The Moros saw this 
demographic shift as a threat, and it helped fuel a bitter distrust between the Moros and the 
Philippine government.86 So deep was the societal rift at this point, that Muslim leaders in 
Mindanao and Sulu petitioned the United States to keep their provinces under American 
rule rather than be placed under control of the Philippine government.87 After the 
Philippines gained full independence in 1946, the resettlement of Christians to Mindanao 
continued. Land reform measures enacted by the Philippine government again drove a 
massive influx of Christians into Mindanao, resulting in a relatively small portion of 
Mindanao remaining Muslim-majority.88 
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Although Mindanao experienced a period of relative peace following the war with 
the Americans, government policies during this period stoked tension and fueled 
grievances among the Muslim population. In the late 1960s, tensions reached a boiling 
point, and insurgency once again erupted in the early 1970s in a conflict that to date has 
claimed an estimated 200,000 lives and displaced an additional 1.5 million people.89  
 Conflict with the MNLF 
With tensions between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) 
and the Moros already high due to the perception among Muslims that incoming Christians 
were stealing their land,90 a 1968 incident called the Jabidah Massacre inflamed tensions 
to the breaking point. In an event still shrouded by disputed facts, a Philippine Air Force 
officer recruited a number of Muslims to take part in a secret program designed to train 
them for infiltration of the Malaysian territory of Sabah.91 The officers in charge of these 
recruits allegedly executed between 14 and 68 of them in a camp located in Corregidor.92 
Reports of this incident became public, sparking the formation of the Muslim Independence 
Movement (MIM).93 The MIM represented the first major secessionist movement to arise 
after World War II.94  
The MNLF emerged from the MIM in 1969, founded by an MIM member named 
Nur Misuari.95 The MNLF’s original objective was the establishment of an independent 
Moro state covering Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu archipelago, although it later, after 
pressure from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), changed this objective to 
Moro autonomy.96  
                                                 
89 Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict,” 39. 
90 Fowler, “Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now,” 7. 
91 Michael Leifer, “The Philippines and Sabah Irredenta,” The World Today 24, no. 1 (October 1968): 
422–423. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Cline, “The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines,” 119. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 120. 
96 Pobre and Quilop, In Assertion of Sovereignty Volume One, 5. 
 25 
Libya and Malaysia provided essential support to the MNLF during its early years, 
enabling the MNLF to attain the capabilities of a significant military organization. Libya 
overtly supported the MNLF, supplying it with funds, training, and arms, and the MNLF 
established its headquarters in Tripoli.97 Malaysia reportedly gave logistical support to the 
MNLF, and the Malaysian state of Sabah provided sanctuary and training for MNLF 
fighters.98  
In 1972, President Marcos’ declaration of martial law provided the spark that 
ignited all the pent-up tension into a full-scale insurgency.99 The MNLF began the 
insurgency with an uprising in Marawi City, which soon escalated into a conflict of “almost 
civil-war proportions” throughout Mindanao and Sulu.100 Marcos responded with a 
declaration of “total war” and the deployment of over half of the AFP to the Southern 
Philippines to quell the insurgency.101 After the fighting began, thousands of people joined 
the MNLF, and, in the first four years of conflict, the MNLF grew to an estimated 30,000 
armed fighters.102  
The early years of the insurgency claimed thousands of lives and cost the GRP 
about $1 million a day.103 However, by 1976, momentum had clearly shifted to the 
counterinsurgency forces, and the MNLF began to lose effectiveness due to several factors. 
First, the AFP began to achieve tactical success on the battlefield. The MNLF’s early 
strategy involved attempting to seize and hold towns or rural areas.104 This strategy, 
because of the AFP’s superior numbers and firepower, usually ended in disaster for MNLF 
fighters, forcing the MNLF to shift to “unconventional tactics of hit-and-run operations 
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and ambushes.”105 Second, Malaysia drastically reduced its support, and Libya began to 
negotiate with the GRP.106 Third, fractures began to appear within the MNLF organization, 
with a rift developing between MNLF military leadership in the Philippines and the MNLF 
organizational leadership based in Tripoli.107 Furthermore, the MNLF began to split along 
ethnic lines, and, as a result, “the organization narrowed to a Tausug constituency.”108 
Following a diplomatic push with Libya and the OIC, the Philippines reached its 
first peace agreement with the MNLF in 1976.109 This agreement, known as the Tripoli 
Accords, offered regional autonomy to Muslims in 13 provinces in Mindanao and the 
nearby islands.110 The “peace,” however, only lasted for a few months, as a majority of 
Muslims boycotted the subsequent autonomy referendum111 and the MNLF accused 
Marcos of rigging the referendum and making the promised autonomy a sham.112 Armed 
hostility resumed, but from this point on the MNLF fought as a much weaker organization 
than it had at its peak in the early 1970s.113 
A major reason for the MNLF’s weakening was a number of splits that resulted 
from the 1976 peace deal, one split being particularly prominent. Unhappy with the 
MNLF’s compromise with the GRP, a group of Islamists splintered off from the MNLF, 
forming a more radical organization that would later become the MILF.114 Although the 
split was primarily driven by ideological differences,115 it occurred mostly along tribal and 
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linguistic lines, with the Tausug, Yakan, and Samal members remaining in the MNLF and 
the Maranao and Maguindanao joining the MILF.116 
During the 1980s, the GRP and the AFP focused their attention on the communist 
insurgency in the Philippines, which, at the time, was seen as a greater threat to the country 
than the Moro insurgency.117 Cline asserts that “the subsequent overstretching of the army 
almost certainly led to a policy of conservation of forces against the Moros,” and that “this 
was reflected both in government policy and troop deployments.”118 Due to the MNLF’s 
weakened state, the Philippines considered the Moro problem contained for the time 
being.119 Nonetheless, the Philippines made another attempt at a peace deal in 1986 by 
agreeing to a ceasefire and committing to negotiation.120 This tentative truce lasted less 
than a year, collapsing when President Corazon Aquino, under tremendous pressure from 
the military, announced a “total war” against all insurgents.121  
The influence and effectiveness of the MNLF continued to wane over the next 
decade in the face of the GRP’s offensive and diminishing outside support. The Philippines 
finally managed to reach a peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996. The Philippines had 
passed a law in 1989 that formalized the ARMM as a legal entity,122 and, as part of the 
1996 peace agreement, the MNLF abandoned its goal of independence in favor of 
autonomy.123 MNLF founder Nur Misauri was elected as governor of the ARMM shortly 
thereafter.124 As part of the agreement, the Philippines created a Special Zone of Peace and 
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Development (SZOPAD) in the Southern Philippines, pledging millions of dollars for the 
development of the Moro region.125 
Two notable things followed the peace agreement. First, and most significant, 
Pobre and Quilop observe that “with the signing of the agreement, the MNLF ceased to be 
a secessionist rebel group and has since been a part of the mainstream body politic.”126 
Second, the Philippines began integrating MNLF members, placing over 5,000 of them 
into the AFP and an additional 1,500 into the PNP.127  Although achieving peace with the 
MNLF was a major accomplishment in the counterinsurgency effort,128 it failed to bring 
peace to Mindanao, and the signing of the peace agreement with the MNLF elevated the 
MILF as the face of the Moro insurgency.  
 Conflict with the MILF 
The MILF broke with the MNLF in 1977, but at that time its founder, Salamat 
Hashim, called it the New MNLF Leadership.129 In 1984, the MILF became a completely 
separate organization. Hashim changed the name to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front to 
emphasize “‘Islamic’ in its name as its ideology and orientation (more precisely radical 
Islamic revivalist) [and] to distinguish itself from the secular-nationalist MNLF.”130 In 
addition to distinguishing itself from the mostly secular MNLF by stressing its Islamic 
character, the MILF stressed another distinction of its organization. Whereas the MNLF 
showed itself willing to accept territorial autonomy, the MILF initially drew a firm line on 
the territorial issue, stating that nothing short of an independent Muslim state would be 
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acceptable.131 From the time of its inception until its breakout in 1996, the MILF largely 
remained off the GRP’s radar, as the government focused on achieving peace with the 
MNLF. However, during this time, the MILF steadily increased its armed capability, even 
as the MNLF went through a decline.132  
The 1996 peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP launched the MILF 
into position as the main Moro insurgent group and the largest armed entity in the region.133 
Although the MILF had engaged in violent activity prior to 1996, its rapid rise following 
the peace agreement caught the GRP off guard.134 The MILF rejected the peace agreement 
on the grounds that it only provided autonomy instead of independence135 and that it failed 
to actually benefit the Muslims.136 About 5,000 MNLF troops, also displeased with the 
peace agreement, defected to the MILF, nearly doubling MILF’s size.137 
By 2000, the MILF’s armed forces138 resembled a conventional military. Estimates 
place the size of the MILF around 15,000 fighters,139 and these fighters wore uniforms and 
operated out of fixed-site camps.140 Additionally, at least 10,000 irregular fighters were 
available if needed.141 The MILF also operated as a conventional military during this 
period, although Abinales notes that most of the battles fought by the MILF up until this 
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point had been “petty skirmishes.”142 Nonetheless, by 2000, the MILF, headquartered in 
Camp Abu Bakar in the area bordering Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, “controlled 
enormous swaths of territory in central Mindanao and began to establish a proto-state 
governed by the sharia.”143 In the areas it controlled, the MILF established a court system 
that adjudicated both civil and criminal issues.144 The MILF also collected taxes and 
performed police functions,145  attempting to garner legitimacy and fill in the void caused 
by a weak state presence.  
The MILF had become so powerful that the GRP decided to take drastic action, and 
in 2000, President Joseph Estrada announced an “all-out war” against the MILF.146 From 
February through July of 2000, the AFP launched a series of operations in Mindanao,147 in 
what was probably the most significant military action in the campaign against the MILF. 
The operations were successful from a tactical standpoint. Since the MILF had fixed-site 
camps, the AFP—with air and naval support, artillery, and armor—overmatched the MILF 
in firepower and seized all of its objectives,148 including Camp Abu Baker, “the MILF 
symbol of defiance against the government.”149 While Estrada’s 2000 war only resulted in 
an estimated 3% reduction of the total MILF strength,150 Abinales calls the outcome 
“devastating for the MILF,” as all of its main camps were lost to GRP forces.151  
The aftermath of the AFP operations in 2000 revealed three notable effects. First, 
the MILF changed its tactics, shifting from a conventional-type military force to a guerilla 
force. No longer did the MILF use fixed sites, but it began to operate out of hidden, mobile 
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camps that were much more difficult to target.152 Also, the MILF’s territorial control 
became much more fluid,153 and it found itself confined to a smaller and more constricted 
area.154 Second, the MILF, upset by the force used against it and especially angry about 
the loss of Camp Abu Bakar, pulled out of preliminary peace talks that had been going on 
for several years.155 Third, armed clashes between the MILF and the GRP significantly 
declined.156 
In 2001, Estrada’s successor, President Macapagal Arroyo, brought the MILF back 
to the negotiating table by declaring an “all-out peace” policy and instituting a unilateral 
cease-fire.157 These negotiations resulted in a new Tripoli Agreement in June of 2000, a 
joint statement in which both sides gave concessions.158 The MILF showed willingness to 
consider autonomy rather than independence, and the GRP showed it was willing to drop 
arrest warrants for MILF leaders.159 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. set up the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) to operate in Mindanao and Sulu as part of 
its Global War on Terror.160 This task force had the mission of training, advising, and 
supporting Philippine security forces in counterterrorist operations.161 Although JSOTF-
P’s primary target was the Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence of the 
MILF providing training and limited sanctuary to ASG and the terrorist organization 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) brought the MILF unwanted attention from the American-advised 
AFP.162 Concerned that it would be placed on the list of terrorist organizations and bring 
                                                 
152 Santos, “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” 17. 
153 Podder, “Legitimacy, Loyalty and Civilian Support for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” 502. 
154 Abinales, “The End of War in the Southern Philippines,” 395. 
155 Santos, “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” 17–18. 
156 Abinales, “The End of War in the Southern Philippines,” 395. 
157 Quimpo, “Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace,” 69. 
158 Abuza, Forging Peace in Southeast Asia, 79–80. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Quimpo, “Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace,” 69–70. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Quimpo, “Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace,” 69–70. 
 32 
unwanted international support for the GRP, the MILF formally cut ties with JI163 and 
publicly renounced terrorism in 2003.164 
From 2003 to 2008, fighting between the MILF and the GRP stayed at a relatively 
low level as peace talks and a shaky cease-fire continued. A breakthrough in peace 
negotiations finally occurred in 2008 when the MILF and GRP reached a peace deal that 
created an expanded autonomous government for the Moros and addressed several other 
MILF concerns.165 However, the Supreme Court blocked the GRP from signing the 
document on constitutional grounds,166 and MILF-GRP fighting resumed.167 
Clashes between the MILF and GRP began to ebb in 2010, and when President 
Benigno Aquino took office, a much-weakened MILF resumed peace talks.168 Steady 
progress was made in the peace process, with the two sides agreeing upon a peace deal 
framework in 2012, and finally reaching a comprehensive agreement in 2014.169 Thus, far, 
domestic political factors have prevented the Philippine legislature from enacting the 
agreement into law, and the future of this peace agreement is uncertain.170 However, 
violence between the MILF and the GRP has been reduced to nearly zero in recent years, 
even though the MILF remains an armed organization. 
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 Abu Sayyaf and Global Jihadist Groups 
With the MILF and MNLF contained and shifting from violence to political action, 
smaller groups that pose unique challenges have carried on the Moro insurgency. Although 
in some cases these groups have been classified as terrorist groups or criminal gangs, they 
have stated objectives that involve delegitimizing and ending the authority of the Philippine 
government in the Muslim areas of the Southern Philippines. Although these groups use 
criminal activities for funding and use terrorism to achieve their goals, they meet the 
definition of insurgent groups as defined in Chapter II. Groups falling into this category 
include the ASG, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and the Maute Group. 
The ASG, founded in 1991 by the Islamist radical Abdurajak Janjalani, splintered 
from the MNLF after Janjalani became disenchanted with the MNLF leadership.171 
Janjalani wrote that the ASG’s objectives were to establish an Islamic state and advocated 
war as a means to that end.172 The ASG distinguished itself from the other insurgent groups 
in several ways. In its early years, the ASG received a significant amount of its funding 
from Al Qaeda,173 and, unlike the MNLF and MILF, received little popular support.174 The 
ASG also employed unique tactics, using speedboats to leverage the maritime mobility 
offered by the Mindanao coastline and the Sulu Archipelago.175 Lastly, the ASG did not 
shy away from targeting civilians.176 
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Since the early 2000s, the roughly 400-man strong177 ASG has been the primary 
target of the military portion of the GRP’s counterinsurgency efforts.178 The GRP has had 
success in killing or arresting a number of the ASG leaders, resulting in the group becoming 
fragmented in recent years.179 However, the ASG remains a major threat. In addition to the 
ASG’s penchant for terrorist attacks, in 2016 a faction of the ASG, called the Isnilon 
Hapilon faction, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), keeping 
the group at the top of the list of the GRP’s concerns in Mindanao.180 
The BIFF emerged in 2010, splintering from the MILF as a result of disapproval of 
the MILF’s peace dealings with the GRP.181 While clashes between the MILF and GRP 
were tapering off, the AFP had to put resources toward combating the BIFF. Chalk writes 
that the BIFF showed itself “willing and capable of engaging Philippine security forces, 
targeting both military and police outposts” with the stated objective of those attacks being 
“to sabotage the peace process between the government and the MILF as part of the long-
term goal of achieving Bangsamoro independence.”182 In 2014, the BIFF joined the ASG 
in pledging allegiance to ISIS,183 in another case of a Philippine insurgent group aligning 
itself with the greater jihad movement. 
The Maute Group bears mentioning as the organization that has made the most 
significant impact on the security situation in Mindanao in recent years. The Maute Group, 
ISIS-linked and founded by the radical brothers Omar and Abdullah Maute in 2012, was 
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virtually unknown until it began conducting high profile attacks in 2016.184 In June of 
2016, after a series of operations against the Maute Group, the AFP captured the Maute 
Group’s stronghold and declared the group defeated.185 This assessment turned out to be 
very wrong, and in November 2016, the Maute Group occupied the town of Butig in Lanao 
del Sur, sparking a major clash with the AFP and displacing about 90 percent of the local 
population.186 In May of 2017, a group of about 700 rebels, led by the Maute Group, 
occupied Marawi City, which had a population of 200,000.187 Marawi turned into the 
center of a major battle that persisted for months. When the five-month long siege ended 
in October, the fighting had claimed the lives of over 900 rebels and 165 Philippine security 
force members.188 
The Marawi battle poses two concerns for the GRP’s counterinsurgency efforts. 
First, by being able to control a city as large as Marawi, the Maute Group has gained a 
tremendous amount of publicity, which aids the recruiting efforts of the various insurgent 
groups, and challenges the idea that the GRP is capable of providing adequate security in 
Mindanao. Second, the ASG and the BIFF supported the Maute Group in the Marawi 
occupation,189 demonstrating that the ISIS-affiliated groups can and will cooperate with 
each other and signifying the potential for a larger and more organized Islamist insurgency. 
Other insurgent groups in the Southern Philippines have aligned themselves with 
ISIS since 2014, such as Ansar Khilafah.190 These groups have established training camps 
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in Mindanao191 and have raised concerns within the GRP of a potential new threat coming 
from ISIS-affiliated foreign fighters entering the region, as is the pattern with ISIS-linked 
groups in other countries.192 At the beginning of the Marawi siege, President Rodrigo 
Duterte declared martial law for the entire island of Mindanao in order to combat what was 
feared to be a growing insurgency.193 
In dealing with organizations such as the ASG and the Maute Group, the GRP’s 
efforts have been mostly of a military nature, with Franco noting that “combat operations 
take precedence over negotiations.”194 In parallel with its military counterinsurgency 
operations, the GRP has put resources into the economic development of Mindanao, in an 
attempt to increase support from the Muslim population.195 Actions in areas of both 
security and development have been managed by the central government. Although the 
GRP has largely followed the counterinsurgency principles outlined in Chapter 1, it has 
focused its efforts at the national level, with little effort put into localization. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE PHILIPPINES’ COUNTERINSURGENCY 
STRATEGY 
Overall, the GRP has not yet achieved counterinsurgency success, as evidenced by 
the fact that insurgency remains in Mindanao. However, this does not suggest that the GRP 
has failed to make notable achievements. The GRP has effectively eliminated the two 
largest insurgent groups in the MNLF and MILF. This section analyzes the GRP’s 
counterinsurgency campaign, identifying shortfalls as well as areas in which its efforts have 
produced good results. 
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 Military Effectiveness 
Because the GRP has used the military as “the chief instrument of 
counterinsurgency,”196 the AFP’s performance in this role bears special scrutiny in the 
evaluation of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. The AFP has received criticism of its 
counterinsurgency effectiveness throughout the years. For example, Cline, writing in 2000, 
stated, “Although some government offensives and sweeps were conducted, reporting from 
the period suggests that most clashes were initiated by the guerrillas, with government 
forces typically being in reactive mode. There is little evidence of any particular 
counterinsurgent tactical proficiency among the Philippine military.”197 Although 
statements such as these are accurate at face value, they should be examined in the context 
of objectives and results. In this context, two points counter criticism of the AFP. First, if 
complete destruction of the insurgent groups were the objective, then the AFP’s campaigns 
against the MNLF and MILF could be considered abysmal failures; however, the AFP’s 
Office of Strategic and Special Studies clearly asserts that “total annihilation of the MILF 
was not a policy goal.”198 Second, when the AFP did take offensive initiative, such as 
during the multiple declarations of “all-out war” and particularly during the 2000 offensive, 
it had resounding tactical success.  
The AFP’s overarching objective in fighting the MNLF and the MILF was to 
contain those groups and weaken them to the point that they were willing to negotiate a 
peace agreement.199 In this context, the AFP accomplished its objective. The AFP managed 
to weaken both the MNLF and the MILF to the point that those groups were willing to 
concede the issue of independence in pursuit of a peace agreement. Ultimately, the AFP 
reduced an insurgency that began as a conventional military force to a force relying upon 
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decentralized guerilla tactics and then further reduced it to small groups reliant on terror 
tactics.  
Another area that should be evaluated is whether the GRP adequately resourced the 
AFP for its counterinsurgency campaign. Assessing resources is somewhat difficult 
because the level of resources applied to the Mindanao counterinsurgency waxed and 
waned through the 50-year conflict. For good portions of the conflict, most of the GRP’s 
military resources were applied to fighting communist insurgents, as noted above. At other 
times, the GRP deployed more than half of the entire military to Mindanao to combat the 
Moro insurgency, with Abuza stating that at one point the insurgency in Mindanao tied 
down 70–80 percent of the armed forces.200 Aside from troop levels, several sources 
highlight equipment shortfalls for the AFP. De Castro points to a 2007 capability 
assessment conducted by the AFP, noting that “the report stated that the poor condition of 
the equipment severely affected the military’s effectiveness and efficiency in counter-
insurgency operations.”201 Pobre and Quilop echo this assessment, stating that “on account 
of budgetary constraints, the AFP did not have enough of modern and more combat-
effective equipment and weapons, such as [night vision goggles], precision-guided 
weapons, modern, artillery, and modern small arms.”202  
While it seems clear that the counterinsurgency effort in Mindanao was at times 
undermanned due to the priority given to the anti-communist campaign, and while 
equipment shortfalls undoubtedly added to the tactical challenge faced by the AFP, these 
things can hardly be pinpointed as the factors leading to an ongoing insurgency today. It 
can be argued that resource shortfalls protracted armed conflict with the MNLF and MILF, 
but resource shortfalls for the AFP do not play a significant role in the current 
counterinsurgency operations against groups such as the ASG and Maute Group. 
According to Franco, the AFP currently has deployed to Mindanao “four [Philippine Army 
(PA)] Infantry Divisions, most of the assets of the PA’s lone Mechanized Infantry Division, 
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and several Philippine Marine Corps’ (PMC) Battalion Landing Teams. In addition to these 
conventional forces are contingents from the PA Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
and their counterparts from the Navy and Air Force.”203 This amounts to nearly 40 percent 
of the AFP’s ground combat power, and considering that the MILF is not in an active state 
of armed conflict, it is difficult to argue that the GRP is not providing an adequate number 
of troops to Mindanao. Likewise, the military aid that the United States provided to the 
AFP post-9/11 has gone a long way in modernizing the AFP’s equipment. Despite 
President Duterte’s seemingly cooler attitude toward the United States, U.S. support has 
continued into 2017, with the United States providing the AFP with a host of equipment 
ranging from sniper rifles to unmanned aerial systems.204 Although the AFP’s equipment 
may still have room for improvement, the AFP is far better armed than any insurgent group 
in the Mindanao region, and resource shortfalls do not explain the failure to end the 
insurgency. 
 Failed Peace Processes 
The political aspect should be examined as a possible hindrance to 
counterinsurgency success. The GRP achieved a peace agreement with the MNLF, but, 
despite reaching a landmark deal with the MILF in 2014, the GRP has thus far failed to 
make this agreement binding by enacting it into law. President Duterte came to office in 
2016, raising optimism that prospects of a lasting peace agreement with the MILF would 
be revived. Although Duterte has revived efforts to work toward “forging a final solution 
on Bangsamoro,”205 it is unclear whether the legislature is any more likely now to approve 
such an agreement than it was several years ago. The question is if the GRP’s ability to 
work out a peace agreement should be used as a measure of counterinsurgency success. 
Peace agreements were instrumental in ending or reducing conflict with the MNLF and 
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MILF, but this thesis questions whether peace agreements are an effective measure of 
success in regards to the current counterinsurgency effort.  
If the GRP were to successfully pass and implement the MILF peace agreement or 
a modified version of it, very little would change with regard to the GRP’s 
counterinsurgency efforts. The AFP-MILF cease-fire has created a de facto peace scenario. 
Figure 4 shows the number of armed encounters between the GRP and MILF by year, with 
only one armed encounter occurring between 2012 and 2015. Also, the MILF has formed 
a political party and entered politics,206 signifying a fundamental shift toward pursuing 
legitimate means to its objectives rather than armed insurgency. Quimpo assesses that 
“even if the [peace agreement] collapses, it is most unlikely for the MILF to return to war 
or shift to jihadism.”207 Additionally, the bulk of the GRP’s counterinsurgency efforts are 
focused on organizations such as the ASG and the Maute Group, which are the current face 
of the insurgency. The disconnected nature of these groups, the horizontal structure of the 
current insurgency, the radical ideology of these groups, and their willingness to use 
terrorism renders a peace deal, such as those agreed to by the MNLF and MILF, unlikely 
and perhaps even impossible. While a final peace agreement with the MILF is certainly 
worth pursuing, the success or failure of such an agreement will likely have little impact 
from a counterinsurgency standpoint going forward. Furthermore, the peace agreements 
have accommodated single groups, thus either fueling or prolonging conflict with the 
groups unsatisfied with those agreements. The MNLF peace deal led to the rise of the MILF 
and ASG, and peace talks with the MILF, despite the absence of a final agreement, 
contributed to the emergence of the newer, more radical insurgency. 
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Figure 4.  Armed encounters between the MILF and GRP by year.208 
 Effectiveness of Population Engagement/Development Projects 
The GRP has recognized that ending the Moro insurgency would require increasing 
the Moro peoples’ perceptions of its legitimacy and addressing the causes of popular 
discontent with the government. Although military action has made up most of the GRP’s 
counterinsurgency strategy, the GRP has made efforts at developing the Mindanao region 
since the early days of the counterinsurgency in order to eliminate what it sees as root 
causes of insurgency. In the 1970s, the Marcos administration implemented developmental 
programs targeting the Muslim areas, focusing mostly on infrastructure, health, and 
education.209 In 1997, President Ramos implemented measures to attract foreign 
investment into the ARMM and spent “$1.6 billion for Mindanao to develop infrastructure, 
power, housing, irrigation, and livelihood projects in the region.”210 President Arroyo 
continued to make development a priority of the GRP’s Mindanao peace efforts, 
implementing policies in 2001 toward that end.211 
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The GRP, under the Benigno Aquino administration, greatly stepped up its efforts 
to take a more holistic counterinsurgency approach in what can be considered a shift in the 
GRP’s counterinsurgency strategy toward a more population-centric approach. In 2010, 
the AFP released a new Internal Peace and Security Plan, which closely paralleled the 
counterinsurgency principles outlined in Chapter I. This plan stated the AFP’s primary 
focus as “Winning the Peace and not just defeating the enemy”212 and outlined an approach 
that “puts people’s welfare at the center of its operations.”213 Also, the plan framed security 
in a “whole of nation approach,” recognizing the need for cooperative and unified efforts 
between the AFP, other governmental and non-governmental agencies, and local 
communities, stating that “the AFP cannot single-handedly solve the internal peace and 
security concerns of the country.214 As part of the whole of nation approach, the GRP 
continued to increase efforts at development. The 2012 peace agreement framework 
between the GRP and MILF contained mechanisms for socioeconomic development in the 
Muslim areas of Mindanao.215 Foreign aid also comprised a significant portion of 
Mindanao development funds. Japan led in foreign contributions, spending 19 billion yen 
in Mindanao investments from 2006–2015.216 Currently, development efforts continue. 
The Philippines’ 2017 budget increases funding for economic growth in the ARMM by 
13.2 percent and increases funding for the Mindanao Development Authority by 45% over 
2016 levels.217 
The above numbers might seem to suggest a great deal of progress in developing 
Mindanao, but economic development takes a long period of time, and thus far the success 
of the GRP’s efforts in this area remain to be seen. The poorest province in the Philippines 
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is found in the ARMM, and four of the ten poorest provinces fall in Mindanao.218 In 2015, 
the ARMM had the highest poverty level of any region in the Philippines by a significant 
margin.219 In education, the ARMM has the highest level of children and youth out of 
school of any region.220 A good portion of the problem undoubtedly stems from the 
corruption so pervasive in Mindanao,221 but the problem is also probably part of a vicious 
cycle whereby the security situation hinders investment, and thus economic development, 
and the lack of economic development degrades the security situation. Abuza asserts that 
“regions that are affected by protracted conflicts tend to lag in almost every measure of 
human development,”222 and it would be unfair to lay all the blame for the Southern 
Philippines’ lagging development on the GRP.  
Although the effectiveness of winning the hearts and minds of the people can be 
difficult to measure, the results of several surveys indicate that the GRP may be achieving 
some success in this area. A 2014 survey by The Asia Foundation shows that more people 
in the ARMM approve of the GRP-MILF peace agreement framework than disapprove by 
a more than two-to-one margin.223 Also, recent polling shows that people in Mindanao 
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have higher levels of approval and trust of top GRP officials than the national average,224 
although a large part of this favorability is probably due to President Duterte being the first 
president from Mindanao and someone who claims Moro ancestry. On the other hand, the 
rise of ISIS-linked groups and global jihadist ideology in Mindanao225 creates a new 
dynamic and poses new challenges for the GRP. Although the ISIS-linked insurgent groups 
do not enjoy the level of popular support that the MNLF and MILF did, they are still able 
to find recruiting success. In December 2017, President Duterte asked congress to extend 
martial law in Mindanao for another year, and in justifying the request, he specifically cited 
recruiting efforts by the ASG and Maute Group.226 A measure as drastic as martial law 
suggests that, despite the GRP’s success in building legitimacy in Mindanao, insurgent 
groups still have a target base from which to draw members. 
 Counterinsurgency Localization 
Thus, far, the GRP has kept its counterinsurgency endeavors in Mindanao largely 
centralized under the AFP with little effort put toward meaningful localization. The AFP 
has expressed intent to use localization in its 2010 Internal Peace and Security Plan and in 
its 2017 AFP Development Support and Security Plan, stating in the 2017 plan that local 
governments are the “most critical actors in the development and security of the 
communities”227 and that “AFP units must… closely work and collaborate with concerned 
[local government units].”228 However, even though the plan continues a people-centered 
security approach, the actual strategy portion of the plan holds responsibility for virtually 
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all counterinsurgency functions at the AFP level, with the only portions remotely related 
to localization being guidance for the AFP to “coordinate” activities at the local level. The 
GRP has taken other minor steps toward localization, including the integration of MNLF 
members into the AFP and plans to stand up Muslim units to operate in Muslim areas of 
the country,229 but these measures fall far short of actually pushing counterinsurgency 
functions down to the local level.     
C. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the GRP’s counterinsurgency strategy and performance reveals both 
successes and shortcomings. Although the AFP has had various shortfalls in manning and 
equipment, it has achieved overall tactical success and met strategic objectives in spite of 
those shortcomings. The political environment in the Philippines has thus far prevented a 
peace agreement from being enacted into law. However, the GRP and MILF are currently 
in a de facto peace, and the failure to achieve a peace agreement has had little effect either 
positive or negative on the overall counterinsurgency operations.  
Although the GRP has made efforts to take a “whole of nation” approach to security 
and has put a notable amount of resources into the development of Mindanao, the results 
of these development measures have been underwhelming. Mindanao, and the ARMM in 
particular, contains some of the poorest and most underdeveloped parts of the nation. Also, 
even though the GRP’s population-centric approach seems to be paying dividends in 
establishing government legitimacy, groups like ASG and other ISIS-linked groups are 
conducting massive recruiting efforts, indicating that the GRP faces a challenge in 
countering the spread of global jihadist ideology. Lastly, the GRP has shown very little in 
the way of a serious attempt at localizing the counterinsurgency, choosing rather to keep a 
close hold on counterinsurgency functions at the AFP level.  
The insurgency in the Southern Philippines has gone through two distinct changes. 
First, the MNLF insurgency ended and gave way to the MILF insurgency. Next, as peace 
with the MILF became an achievable goal, an Islamist insurgency with links to the global 
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jihad arose. Each time the GRP made peace with an insurgent group, the most radical 
members of that group split off and continued the insurgency. As a result, each successive 
phase of the insurgency has been more radical in ideology than its predecessor. The GRP’s 
counterinsurgency efforts have proven successful in bringing the MNLF to an agreed upon 
peace and achieving an open-ended cease fire with the MILF with good prospects for a 
peace agreement. However, the newest manifestation of the insurgency, multiple groups 
with allegiance to ISIS, poses an entirely different problem to the GRP. It is unlikely that 
the same counterinsurgency strategy that worked for the MNLF and MILF will have 
success against small, agile organizations that rely upon terrorism as their primary tactic.  
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IV. CHECHNYA CASE STUDY 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Much like the Moro insurgency, the Chechen insurgency in many ways represents 
a repetition of previous conflicts between Chechnya and Russia. This section summarizes 
the historical roots of the conflict and looks at the two counterinsurgency wars waged by 
Russia in recent years. 
 Background of the Conflict/Roots of Insurgency 
The history of Russia attempting to assert control over Chechnya and of Chechens 
violently resisting goes back hundreds of years, establishing a long pattern of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Russian tsars set their sights on 
the territorial conquest of the North Caucasus region.230 In 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk 
led Russia to consider the North Caucasus region as part of the Russian Empire, and the 
first Chechen insurgency began a year later in 1784.231 A Chechen imam named Sheikh 
Mansur Usharma led this rebellion, fomenting a war against Russia that lasted until his 
capture in 1791.232 Although Mansur’s military actions “later became the stuff of legend 
and were cloaked in a romantic shroud,”233 Russia managed to put down the rebellion. 
However, Russia did not have full control over Chechnya, and Mansur’s rebellion set a 
precedent of resistance.  
Following Mansur’s capture and subsequent death in captivity, the Chechens 
continued to conduct raids and ambushes against Russian forces.234 In 1816, Tsar 
Alexander ordered a military campaign to establish Russian control of the Caucasus.235 
General Aleksei Yermolov, given the task of establishing order in Chechnya and the 
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surrounding areas, began a savage campaign of forced resettlements, deforestation, and 
destruction, even razing entire villages in response to attacks.236 Yermolov set another 
precedent of brutal counterinsurgency tactics in Chechnya, with Schaefer describing 
Yermolov’s tactics as “permanently [setting] the savage tone for all future Russian-
Chechen conflicts.”237  
The next conflict between Russia and the Chechens lasted 30 years, beginning in 
1829 and ending in 1859.238 This phase of the Chechen insurgency saw the rise of Imam 
Shamil, a brilliant tactician and charismatic leader, who is revered as a folk hero in 
Chechnya to this day.239 Under Shamil’s leadership, the Chechens effectively used guerilla 
warfare tactics and the natural advantage provided by their region’s mountainous terrain to 
avoid the head-to-head battles with the Russians that led to Mansur’s downfall.240 The 
insurgents frustrated Russian forces for a number of years. However, following the 
Crimean War, Russia repurposed an additional 200,000 troops to the North Caucasus.241 
With its massive advantage in numbers and firepower, Russia once again crushed the 
rebellion, captured Shamil, and formally annexed Chechnya into the Russian Empire in 
1859.242  
In 1918, following the collapse of the Tsarist regime, Chechnya, along with the 
other peoples of the region, declared independence and established the North Caucasus 
Mountain Republic.243 In 1921, Russia incorporated Chechnya into an Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR), and Stalin promised this ASSR a high degree of autonomy.244 
The Mountain ASSR, as it was called, only lasted for a few years, and in 1925, Soviet 
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forces deployed to Chechnya to crack down on guerilla activity and Islamic practices.245 
The next decade saw a number of relatively small Chechen uprisings and Soviet responses, 
and the Soviet Union combined Chechnya and Ingushetia into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR 
in 1936.246  
The Soviet Union’s most significant response to Chechen uprisings thus far 
occurred in 1944 with Operation Lentil. Europe was in the midst of World War II, and 
Stalin, concerned that Chechen insurgents would join Germany in fighting against the Red 
Army, took preemptive action.247 Stalin, whose solution was extreme in every way, 
intended to solve the Chechnya problem by completely eliminating it. Galeotti writes, 
“Near enough over a single fateful night…the entire Chechen population of 480,000 was 
deported in Operation Lentil. Up to 200,000 died in what the Chechens often describe 
as…the Exodus. Resettled and scattered across Central Asia, Siberia and Kazakhstan, the 
Chechens were only allowed to return to their homeland in 1956, after Stalin’s death.”248 
At this point, Russia-Chechnya conflicted entered a period of relative dormancy until the 
1990s. 
 The First Chechen War: 1994–1996 
In 1991, taking advantage of the turmoil caused by the impending collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Chechnya declared itself an independent state and elected Dzhokar Dudayev 
as its president.249 Although this move by Chechnya created tensions with Russia, a 
preoccupied Russia avoided military conflict at first.250 However, the situation drastically 
escalated in 1994. Chechen units backed by Moscow seized several villages, and Dudayev 
responded by launching attacks against Russian units, causing significant Russian 
casualties.251 Russian President Boris Yeltsin, facing domestic unpopularity and a poor 
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economy, followed the advice of his military advisors and initiated a military intervention 
to regain control of Chechnya.252 
In December of 1994, nearly 24,000 Russian troops, supported by air and armor, 
entered Chechnya.253 Russia considered the Chechen capital city of Grozny to be the center 
of gravity and mistakenly assumed that seizing Grozny would quickly end the war.254 Thus, 
Russian forces bypassed areas defended by Chechen forces en route to Grozny and 
approached the city from multiple directions, intending to seal off and then take the 
city.255 For the Russians, this operation quickly turned into a complete debacle, as they 
encountered far more resistance than they expected and as their stalled armored tank 
columns quickly became immobile targets for well-defended Chechen positions.256 Oliker 
writes, “Within the first hours of battle, Russian units were trapped in the streets, their 
armored vehicles destroyed by enemy troops shooting from upper and lower stories of 
buildings that main tank guns could not effectively engage…Entire tank columns were 
effectively paralyzed by the immobilization of the lead and trail vehicles.”257  
With the initial Russian assault on Grozny failing to seize the city, Russian forces 
began a more deliberate assault, slowly and cautiously working their way through the 
city.258 The Russians also increased the amount of air and artillery support, causing 
tremendous civilian casualties and collateral damage. After weeks of fighting, Russian 
forces managed to take Grozny, but in doing so “literally raze[d] Grozny into rubble to 
gain control of the capital.”259 Galeotti describes the post-battle Grozny as “a ruin, strewn 
with the bodies of thousands of its citizens—estimates range up to 35,000—in a bloodbath 
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that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would describe as 
an ‘unimaginable catastrophe.’”260  
Following the fall of Grozny, thousands of additional Russian troops poured into 
Chechnya, but Chechen rebels had mostly fled into the mountain and forest areas from 
which they could stage effective guerilla attacks and raids.261 Although fighting was now 
sporadic and less intense, the battle for Grozny had set the tone for the rest of the First 
Chechen War. Russian soldiers found it very difficult to distinguish between civilian non-
combatants and Chechen guerilla fighters, as is characteristic of most insurgencies. 
However, in many ways, Russia’s wanton disregard for civilian life was used as a 
deliberate tactic. Finch describes the Russian mindset as follows: “If Chechen civilians did 
not betray their sons, fathers, and neighbors who were fighting for Chechen independence, 
then these same civilians were complicit and could be treated as the enemy.”262 As Russian 
forces spread out from Grozny, they used artillery to prepare an area thoroughly before 
entering it, effectively “turning each village and town into a mini-Grozny.”263 
During this phase of the war, Russia’s destructive methods prompted two events 
that would have significant ramifications later on. First, Dudayev appealed to Muslims 
worldwide for aid in the fight against Russia, describing the war as a jihad.264 This sparked 
the first wave of foreign fighters, many of whom were veterans of the Afghanistan conflict 
with the Soviet Union, to enter the war on behalf of Chechnya.265 Although the “first war 
in Chechnya was waged almost exclusively in the name of national independence,” with 
these foreign fighters came a jihadist ideology that saw Chechnya as “a theater of rebels 
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began to adopt terrorist tactics, not hesitating to target Russian civilians. In June of 
1995operation in the broader global Islamist onslaught.”266  
Second, Chechen, Chechen commander Shamil Basayev led a cross-border 
expedition into the Russian town of Budyonnovsk, where Chechen rebels seized around 
1,800 hostages—150 of which were children.267 A botched hostage rescue attempt left 
Russia humiliated and 147 people dead, and when the situation ended, Basayev managed 
to make it back to Chechnya unharmed.268 A similar situation occurred in January 1996, 
when Chechens conducted a raid on a Russian air base in the Dagestani city of Kizlyar and 
subsequently seized a hospital along with about 2,000 hostages.269 Once again, the Russian 
response proved embarrassing in its ineffectiveness. This incident ended with numerous 
Russian and civilian casualties and with most Chechen rebels able to make it back to 
Chechnya uncaptured.270 
The final major battle of the First Chechen War occurred in August 1996. Russia 
managed to kill Dudayev in July,271 and by August, Aslan Maskhadov, who assumed the 
leadership mantel of the Chechen insurgency, ordered a daring assault on Grozny. Fifteen 
hundred Chechen militants infiltrated Grozny under cover of darkness, and within hours, 
they had seized the majority of the city, trapping thousands of Russian troops within 
Grozny.272 The rebels’ success prompted a stream of additional militants into the city to 
fight the Russians and an uncoordinated, piecemeal flow of Russian units into Grozny to 
join the fight.273 Russia’s counter-assault garnered little success, and, in typical fashion, 
Russian forces resorted to air and artillery shelling of the already war-torn city, causing an 
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exodus of refugees.274 After two weeks of fighting, “an estimated 220,000 people had fled 
Grozny, leaving no more than 70,000 civilians in a city which before the war had been 
home to 400,000.”275  
With public opinion in Russia already turning against the war, this latest military 
debacle pushed Russia to the point where it was ready to end the war. By the end of August, 
Russia and Chechnya signed the Khasav-Yurt Accord. Under the terms of this agreement, 
Chechnya abandoned its claim to independence but was granted an unprecedented degree 
of autonomy.276 Also, Russia agreed to a full withdrawal of troops by the end of the year.277 
Russia conceded far more than Chechnya in this agreement, and by virtually any measure, 
Russia had lost the war.  
The First Chechen War proved costly to both sides, but civilians and noncombatants 
fared the worst. Conservative estimates put the Russian dead at 7,500, along with 4,000 
Chechen fighters killed and up to 35,000 civilians.278 
 The Second Chechen War: 1999–2009 
During the roughly three-year period between the two Chechen Wars, two notable 
things occurred. First, Russia “failed to provide sufficient funds to rebuild the Chechen 
infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the First Chechen War.”279 Chechnya, which 
was one of the most economically depressed areas of Russia before the war, was now in a 
state of war-torn ruin. Second, a more radical form of Islam began to gain a significant 
foothold in Chechnya. Foreign fighters who had entered Chechnya during the first war now 
held influential positions, advising high-level Chechen politicians.280 These foreign 
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fighters gradually shifted Chechnya’s political narrative from one of independence toward 
a narrative of Chechnya being part of the global jihad, even establishing Al Qaeda-linked 
training camps within Chechnya.281 
In 1999, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who came to office as a strong 
proponent of asserting Russian control over Chechnya,282 presided over the launch of the 
Second Chechen War. A Chechen invasion of neighboring Dagestan provided Putin with 
the reason he needed to deploy forces to Chechnya.283 This invasion of Dagestan, which 
was led by Basayev, was a direct result of Al-Qaeda’s influence on Chechen decision 
makers and its vision to connect Afghanistan and the North Caucasus in a contiguous 
Islamic state.284 The war began in October 1999, when Russia deployed nearly 100,000 
troops and security forces to Chechnya, a number over three times larger than the amount 
of troops with which they started the first war.285 From the beginning of the conflict, Putin 
framed it as a counterterrorist operation, portraying Russia’s actions as saving the Russian 
people from a foreign terrorist threat.286 
Russia’s ground assault into Chechnya, like in the first war, commenced with the 
objective of seizing Grozny. However, in contrast to the previous war, Russian forces 
moved slowly and methodically, seizing key villages and terrain along the way.287 Russia 
did not forsake its previous practice of using air, rockets, and artillery for preparation of 
villages and urban areas prior to entering them.288 The pattern of disregard for collateral 
damage continued, with Schaefer remarking that Russia’s artillery preparation “left Grozny 
looking like Berlin in 1945.”289 
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Another change Russia made in its conduct of the second war was its use of 
Chechens to assist in the fighting. “In the first Chechen War the implicit assumption was 
that Chechens were all threats to be neutralized,” Galeotti writes, but this time “they 
eagerly recruited Chechens, including rebel defectors…realizing that such fighters were 
often best suited to taking the war to the rebels.”290 Additionally, Akhmad Kadyrov, the 
chief mufti of Chechnya, grew concerned over the radical jihadist influence over the 
Chechen insurgency and joined the Russians, bringing a number of militants with him.291 
Despite heavy casualties on both sides, Russia successfully achieved most of its 
tactical objectives. Kramer writes, “By February 2000 the Russian army had taken control 
of Grozny, and by mid-2000 Russian troops…had gained a firm presence through most of 
Chechnya and at least nominal control of all major towns.”292 At this point, the heavy 
fighting was over, but the counterinsurgency would continue on for nearly another decade. 
With insurgents pressured by both Russian forces and the Chechen militias that Russia was 
able to coopt, no major battles occurred after 2000.293 The insurgents were left carrying 
out small-scale raids and terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings and two very high 
profile attacks outside of Chechnya on a theater in Moscow and a school in Beslan.294 
In 2000, Russia also took a strategic step that turned into one of the most significant 
moves of the entire counterinsurgency campaign, implementing policies that later became 
known as “Chechenization.” This strategy of Chechenization went beyond merely using 
Chechens for tactical military and police operations; it involved gradually increasing 
Chechen involvement in all aspects of counterinsurgency and eventually pushing nearly all 
aspects of the counterinsurgency down to the local level.  
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This process began with Putin’s installation of Akhmad Kadyrov as interim 
president of Chechnya.295  Being the former chief mufti of Chechnya and someone who 
had urged Chechens to take up arms against Russia in the first war,296 Kadyrov had some 
measure of credibility with the Chechen populace and, with his strong opposition to the 
foreign-led jihadists that had virtually coopted the insurgency, was uniquely situated to 
carry out Moscow’s strategic objectives at the local level.297 When Kadyrov was 
assassinated by insurgents in 2004, his son Ramzan Kadyrov took the mantel of Chechen 
leadership.298 Most importantly, and probably in good part a result of receiving huge 
amounts of money from Moscow, Ramzan Kadyrov picked up the Chechenization of the 
counterinsurgency where his father left off.299 
Beginning in 2005, the conflict began to take a dramatic turn in favor of the 
counterinsurgency, as Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen forces “started to be increasingly 
deployed in combat against insurgent units, gradually replacing the Russian military as the 
main [counterinsurgency] force.”300 These Chechen forces were able to obtain far more 
intelligence on insurgents than their Russian counterparts. Whereas Chechen civilians had 
a strong aversion to cooperating with Russian security forces in any way, they frequently 
gave information to Chechen security forces.301 Despite Kadyrov’s counterinsurgency 
success, his rule has been highly controversial. He took a very heavy-handed and highly-
authoritarian approach to security, ruling in a way that “involves disappearances, torture, 
and various other human rights abuses.”302 
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The overall violence in Chechnya steadily dwindled over the next several years, 
and in 2009 Russia declared the end of combat operations in Chechnya and withdrew most 
of its troops.303 The lack of a resurgent rebellion in the following years demonstrates that 
Russia’s declaration of victory was not premature. Souleimanov and Aliyev point out that 
since the official end of the Second Chechen War, “Chechnya has been among the most 
secure areas of the North Caucasus.”304 Figure 5 shows armed conflict-related violence 
clearly trending downward in the post-war years, with only 14 deaths in 2015.  
 
Figure 5.  Armed conflict-related deaths in Chechnya by year, 2011–2015.305 
B. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The two Chechen wars provide a somewhat unique case in the study of 
counterinsurgency, because they occurred in a relatively short time span and had 
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contrasting outcomes. This section analyzes Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy for both 
wars, looking at both the successes and failures. 
 Causes of Failure in the First War 
By virtually any measure, Russia’s counterinsurgency efforts in the First Chechen 
War failed miserably. In fact, very little can be found that is positive regarding Russia’s 
performance. The story of the first war is one of a series of failures, both by the military at 
the strategic and tactical levels and by the political leaders.  
From a military perspective, Russia’s shortcomings hindered both the planning and 
execution of this operation. Kim and Blank point out that Russia failed from the very 
beginning to have a strategic counterinsurgency design.306 Russian military leadership 
treated the conflict as one of counter-terrorism rather than counterinsurgency, focusing 
nearly entirely on killing insurgents with little effort put into winning the Chechen 
population.307 Additionally, Russia ignored the local Chechen government,308 failing to 
provide support the very institutions that could help bring about peace. As a result, 
Chechnya experienced a massive breakdown in public order during the first war.309 To 
compound the error of poor strategy, Russia greatly underestimated the Chechen fighters. 
Russia expected to achieve a fairly easy victory and expected the resistance to fold 
quickly.310 
Russia brought into Chechnya a force poorly organized, trained, and equipped. 
Russian soldiers were unprepared and untrained in urban combat,311 comprising a force 
that Schaefer describes as full of “barely trained conscripts.”312 Also, a RAND Corporation 
study found that coordination was virtually nonexistent among various Russian units and 
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security organizations, creating a tactical environment in which the Russians were fighting 
with no single, organized effort and in which intelligence sharing severely suffered.313  
Russia made another strategic blunder in its heavy reliance on indirect fire in the 
form of air and artillery strikes. Cohen states that this approach was the “wrong strategy 
for the type of warfare they faced in Chechnya” and that “Russian generals were using 
strategies that would be appropriate in a large-scale military operation with a clearly 
defined battlefront, but not for guerilla war in Chechnya.”314 This strategic blunder 
impacted Russia’s counterinsurgency effort in two ways. First, Chechen insurgents 
exploited Russia’s reliance on indirect fire by staying close to Russian troops, thereby 
negating the effectiveness of bombardments.315 Second, Russia’s indiscriminate use of 
firepower and the massive destruction it inflicted upon Chechen cities proved to be 
counterproductive, as it turned much of what little popular support Russia had over to the 
insurgents and helped fuel the radicalization that was occurring in Chechnya.316 
As a result of the above military shortcomings—lack of coordination, poor training, 
overuse of indiscriminate indirect fire—Russia lost thousands of soldiers due to fratricide. 
While the exact numbers of Russian casualties that resulted from fratricide cannot be 
ascertained, estimates attribute as much as 60 percent of Russia’s total casualties to friendly 
fire.317 Oliker writes that poorly trained Russian troops “were at least as likely to hit a 
fellow Russian as they were the enemy.”318 
The largest political error made by Russia in the first war was in failing to take a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, relying solely on military means to quell the 
insurgency. Russia’s leaders made no attempt facilitate the economic and social 
development of Chechnya. Chechnya was economically depressed prior to the war, but 
Russia’s scorched earth tactics “left Chechnya in a disastrous economic situation, in which 
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people had only slim prospects for a bright future.”319 As part of the war-ending Khasav-
Yurt agreement, Russia promised to provide for reconstruction and supply economic aid to 
Chechnya.320 However, Russia failed to meet its obligations, ultimately refusing to pay the 
estimated $300 million cost of reconstruction, and following the war, unemployment in 
Chechnya reached 80 percent.321 Not only did Russia lose the military aspect of the 
conflict, it also neglected to make a reasonable effort to address legitimate grievances of 
the Chechens or to take measures designed to increase popular support. 
 Causes of Success in the Second War 
From a military standpoint, Russia made some major adjustments for the second 
war and showed a dramatically increased tactical effectiveness. Russian forces entered 
Chechnya better prepared and trained than they were for the first war. Prior to mobilizing 
for war, the Russian army conducted training and exercises specifically designed to prepare 
them for the counterinsurgency operations in which they would soon take part.322 At the 
unit and higher echelon-level, Russian forces exercised large-scale counterinsurgency and 
worked toward coordinated efforts among disparate units323—one of the major shortfalls 
in the first war. Russia’s preparations also bore fruit at the individual level. Although 
Russia still had a problem with poorly trained and performing conscript troops, the average 
soldier in Chechnya was of better quality and better equipped than his counterpart in the 
first war.324  
Scholars have found a number of shortfalls in the Russian military, even in the 
second war. For example, Kramer writes of equipment deficiencies and archaic 
capabilities, noting that “the Russian military remains stuck in the pre-digital age,”325 and 
Cohen points out that despite the training efforts of the Russian army prior to the war, 
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soldiers were still insufficiently prepared for urban combat.326 However, while criticisms 
such as these are valid in absolute terms, in relative terms, the Russian military showed a 
marked improvement in the second war. This improvement is best indicated by the fact 
that Russian forces succeeded in taking control of Chechnya,327 something they were 
unable to accomplish in the previous war. 
Although the military campaign succeeded in asserting Russian control over 
Chechen territory, the military dimension of the conflict cannot be given credit for 
counterinsurgency success. The Russian military effectively reduced the insurgency to a 
guerilla force capable only of relatively small-scale attacks, but it reached a virtual impasse 
by the early 2000s. Souleimanov and Aliyev write, “Having won the initial, rather 
conventional phase of the war, the Russian Army largely failed to achieve a clear-cut 
victory in the guerrilla phase that ensued.”328 
The single most critical factor leading to Russia’s success was its strategy of 
Chechenization. Localizing the counterinsurgency enabled results that could not be 
obtained solely by military action. Ratelle and Souleimanov call localization a “game 
changer,” asserting that “it has helped to crush the core of the Chechen insurgency after 
years of largely indiscriminate and ineffective counterinsurgency operations carried out by 
Russian armed forces.”329 Galeotti calls the Kadyrovs “crucial instruments of Putin’s 
success in Chechnya.”330 Matejova writes that Russia could not have achieved decisive 
victory through military means, stating that localization “was an excellent solution and 
despite its shortcomings, it appears to be the best policy Putin could have chosen to pursue 
in Chechnya.”331 Hughes calls Chechenization “one key pillar of the Russian 
counterinsurgency.”332  
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As a result of localization and with Kadyrov as a critical enabler, Russia also found 
a great deal of success in the information aspect of the conflict, effectively pushing a 
narrative that countered the insurgent ideology. As the insurgency increasingly shifted 
from a war for independence to part of the global jihad, Russia used this shift and the 
foreign influence that drove it to delegitimize the insurgency in the eyes of the Chechen 
populace. Through Kadyrov, Russia portrayed the insurgency as a threat to traditional 
Chechen culture and the radical Salafist and Wahhabist Islam ideology so prevalent in the 
insurgency as a threat to the traditional Sufi Islam of Chechnya.333 This strategy was more 
effective than trying to convince the Chechens of Russian legitimacy. It helped build up 
Kadyrov’s legitimacy and further supported the Chechenization strategy. Schaefer notes 
that this counter-ideology approach “transformed the conflict from a rigid inter-ethnic war 
(Chechnya fighting Russia for independence) into a civil war between Chechens with 
differing ideologies.”334 Once this split occurred and, along with localization, made the 
counterinsurgency a conflict between two Chechen factions, the much stronger, more well-
resourced side—led by Kadyrov—achieved the victory. 
The two wars—and the Russian military’s destructive methods—left Chechnya in 
a shambles. Russia has put much effort into assisting the economic development of the 
country, funneling huge sums335 of money for reconstruction through Kadyrov.336 
Although pervasive corruption throughout all levels of the Chechen government has caused 
much of this money to be misappropriated,337 some positive results are evident. Russel 
observes that “Ramzan [Kadirov] has achieved tangible success in rebuilding Chechnya’s 
shattered infrastructure,”338 and Dannreuther and March point out that, due to 
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reconstruction efforts, the Chechen economy is now giving indicators of improvement.339 
Despite optimistic signs, Chechnya still has the second highest unemployment rate in the 
Russian Federation, only ahead of neighboring Ingushetia,340 and remains poor compared 
to the rest of Russia. Furthermore, most of Chechnya’s economic progress has occurred 
subsequent to its pacification, making reconstruction and development not a significant 
factor in the defeat of the insurgency. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Russia entered the First Chechen War unprepared and conducted a poorly planned 
and poorly executed military operation characterized by lack of coordination and lack of 
tactical proficiency. The war ended in 1996 with the Russian military humiliated and 
defeated and with none of the problems for which Russia went to war solved. Russia’s 
counterinsurgency failure only strengthened the Chechen insurgency. 
Russia began the Second Chechen War with an increased resolve and achieved a 
dramatically different outcome by 2009. Russia’s success stems partly from a number of 
adjustments made in its military. Russian forces in Chechnya, despite a number of 
shortcomings, were better trained and equipped than their counterparts in the first war. 
Additionally, Russian forces displayed a greater degree of coordination and sound tactics. 
However, military improvements alone were insufficient to achieve counterinsurgency 
success. While the Russian military achieved its territorial objectives, it essentially reached 
a stalemate with the insurgency, unable to effectively deal with small, decentralized 
pockets of guerilla fighters who sought to employ terrorist tactics.  
The turning point in the conflict and the primary key to Russia’s success began 
when Russia fully implemented its strategy of Chechenization, localizing 
counterinsurgency functions. Russia’s cooption of Ramzan Kadyrov and Chechen militias 
that accompanied him destroyed the insurgency in a way that the Russian army could not. 
Chechenization also enabled a counter-ideology information campaign to drive a wedge 
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between the insurgency and Chechen society, driving many Chechens to Kadyrov’s side 
and reframing the Chechen view of the insurgency as a greater threat to Chechen interests 
than Russia. At the tactical level, Chechen security forces found much greater success in 
collecting intelligence and rooting out insurgents than Russian security forces had. At the 
political level, Kadyrov, by using local resources and by having far more legitimacy than 
the Moscow government in the eyes of the Chechen people, was able to assert control over 
Chechnya in a way that had eluded Russia. When Russia declared victory and withdrew 
from Chechnya in 2009, Chechnya had been largely pacified. Since then, violence has 
continued to decrease with no indications of a resurgent militancy. 
Despite Russia’s overall success, it made grave errors and accepted some negative 
trade-offs. Through its disregard for civilian casualties and collateral damage, the Russian 
military clearly violated internationally accepted laws of war. Russia has cast a tremendous 
amount of support behind the Kadyrov regime, which has developed a reputation for 
corruption, brutality, and disregard for human rights. These things have arguably been 
counterproductive from a counterinsurgency standpoint.341 However, the fact that Russia 
still achieved overall success despite the serious flaws in its counterinsurgency 
demonstrates the efficacy of the things that it did right.   
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. EVALUATION OF THE HYPOTHESES 
To evaluate the four hypotheses put forth in Chapter I effectively, it is essential to 
note how the Moro insurgency has changed since the 1970s when the MNLF began armed 
insurrection. The insurgencies in both Mindanao and Chechnya followed similar 
trajectories. As shown in Figure 6, both insurgencies began as ethno-nationalist quests for 
independence and continued as struggles for autonomy within a specific territorial region. 
At a certain point, both insurgencies became infused with foreign influences. Whether a 
product of foreign fighters, foreign ideology, or both, this influence induced a qualitative 
shift that changed the insurgencies into Pan-Islamic insurgencies, aligning the goals of 
insurgent groups with the global jihadist movement and expanding the focus of the 
insurgencies beyond the original territorial objectives.  
 
Figure 6.  Trajectory of insurgencies in Mindanao and Chechnya. 
Recognizing the shift in the insurgencies has two implications for this study. First, 
in the ethno-nationalist phase of insurgency, insurgent groups in both the Philippines and 
Chechnya received widespread support from the populaces in their respective areas. 
Support from the local populaces dropped off in both cases as the insurgencies transitioned 
to Pan-Islamic insurgencies. Second, from a counterinsurgency perspective, the strategies 
and methods that may have been effective against ethno-nationalist insurgents may be less 
than ideal and even ineffective against global jihadists. 
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 Hypothesis 1: Inadequate Resource Commitment 
While specific shortfalls in counterinsurgency resources have been pointed out, this 
hypothesis does not adequately explain the GRP’s failure to end the Mindanao insurgency 
thus far. At certain points throughout the GRP’s nearly fifty-year counterinsurgency efforts 
in Mindanao, resource shortfalls likely degraded the ability to conduct operations 
effectively, specifically during times when the conflict against communist insurgents was 
given priority. However, these periods had limited duration and did not occur in recent 
years. The GRP left a significant portion of its armed forces in Mindanao after fighting 
with the MILF ceased, not only as a safeguard against a renewed outbreak of MILF-led 
violence, but also to combat the splinter groups and ISIS-linked organizations. These troop 
levels have only increased in response to incidents such as the Marawi battle and after 
declaration of martial law in Mindanao. Furthermore, the U.S. has for nearly two decades 
provided a great deal of counterinsurgency support to the GRP in the form of money, 
intelligence support, arms, equipment, and advisors.  
Regarding the commitment of non-military resources, Chapter III describes how 
the GRP has committed a significant amount of funds toward the development of Mindanao 
and has received billions of dollars in foreign aid for Mindanao’s development. Mindanao, 
and specifically the insurgency-infested areas, still economically lags behind most of the 
rest of the Philippines, and the overall development goals have yet to come to fruition. 
While a specific figure for “adequate” funding is impossible to identify, Mindanao’s 
economic situation could potentially raise questions as to whether the GRP has 
appropriated sufficient funds for development. However, the Chechnya case shows that 
economic development is not necessarily a prerequisite for peace. While Russia’s 
development efforts have made progress in Chechnya, Chechnya can still be considered 
underdeveloped in many areas, and most of the tangible results of development efforts 
occurred after the insurgency had ended. Economic development and its benefits to a 
society can certainly help stabilize a war-torn region and probably go a long way in 
preventing a relapse into insurgency, but an active insurgency acts as a tremendous 
stumbling block to development. Although the underdevelopment of the Muslim areas of 
Mindanao has been a source of grievance for insurgent groups, the peace with the MNLF 
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and MILF demonstrates that tangible development progress is not necessarily a 
requirement for peace. Furthermore, in Chechnya, progress in economic development 
occurred mostly after the insurgency ended, showing that, at least in some cases, 
development follows peace rather than causes peace. 
 Hypothesis 2: Political Factors/Failed Peace Agreements 
An assertion that peace agreements did not matter in the overall counterinsurgency 
would be inaccurate. A peace agreement with the MNLF, the largest Mindanao insurgent 
group studied in this thesis, ended the MNLF’s status as an insurgent group. A pending 
peace agreement with the MILF, although not formally enacted into law at this point, has 
reduced MILF-GRP violence to virtually zero since 2012 and enabled the MILF to take 
steps toward integration into the political process. However, the lack of a peace agreement 
cannot be pinpointed as a significant factor for explaining the ongoing Pan-Islamic phase 
of the insurgency. As discussed in Chapter III, the fracturing of the insurgency into multiple 
groups, the radical ideology of the current insurgency, and the proclivity for the use of 
terrorism render peace agreements with these groups unlikely and an unfeasible goal to 
pursue. Even though President Duterte indicated in November 2016 that he may be open 
to negotiations with the ASG,342 the GRP has given no indication that it is seeking peace 
negotiations as part of its counterinsurgency strategy. 
In Chechnya, Russia ended its counterinsurgency without reaching a peace 
agreement with the insurgents. Furthermore, Russia did not seek a peace agreement as part 
of its counterinsurgency strategy. The evidence from both the Philippine and Chechen 
cases lead to the conclusion that peace agreements may be helpful in resolving 
insurgencies, but they are not necessarily a prerequisite for counterinsurgency success. In 
Mindanao, peace agreements are not a significant factor in current counterinsurgency 
campaign. 
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 Hypothesis 3: Lack of a Coherent Counterinsurgency Strategy 
Attributing the GRP’s lack of counterinsurgency success to the absence of a 
coherent counterinsurgency strategy fails to provide a satisfactory explanation in light of 
the evidence. At various times, the GRP’s counterinsurgency strategy did indeed appear 
incoherent and probably hampered the ability of the military and government agencies to 
act in a unified manner. For example, the oscillation between policies of “all-out war” and 
“all-out peace” in the early 2000s undoubtedly created difficulties for those tasked with 
counterinsurgency functions at the strategic level. However, the GRP appears to have 
overcome any problems it may have had in strategic coherence. As the lead 
counterinsurgency organization for the GRP, the AFP’s 2010 Internal Peace and Security 
Plan and 2017 Development Support and Security Plan outline a logical and coherent 
counterinsurgency strategy that takes a whole of government approach to 
counterinsurgency. In 2010, Beaulieu wrote of the Philippines that its “counterinsurgency 
strategy inadequately integrates political and military measures.”343 Aside from the 
separate question of whether or not the GRP’s strategy is the correct one, Beaulieu’s 
criticism appears to no longer apply. 
 Hypothesis 4: Over-centralization of the Counterinsurgency 
The evidence shows that the hypothesis that the GRP’s failure to localize 
counterinsurgency efforts has prevented the GRP from ending the insurgency provides the 
best explanation for the GRP’s lack of counterinsurgency success. Counterinsurgency 
localization was the most significant key to Russia’s counterinsurgency success and also 
happens to be a counterinsurgency principle conspicuously absent in the GRP’s 
counterinsurgency efforts. When the hypotheses are applied to both Russia’s and the GRP’s 
counterinsurgencies (see Table 1), the two countries have a sharp contrast in how they did 
or did not use localization, which presents a reasonable explanation for the contrasting 
outcomes. The next section takes a deeper look at how localization applies to this study.  
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Table 1.   Side-by-side comparison of the four hypotheses applied to the 
Philippines and Russia 
Hypothesis GRP Russia 
1. Resource Shortfalls Not a significant factor. Not a significant factor. 
2. Peace Agreements Key for peace with 
specific groups; not a 
significant factor in the 
post-MILF phase of the 
insurgency. 
Not a significant factor. 
3. Strategy Periodically an issue; not a 
significant factor since 
2010. 
Serious shortfall during first 
war; significantly improved 
during second war. 
4. Localization Not implemented in a 
meaningful way.  
Cornerstone of Russia’s 
counterinsurgency strategy 
in Chechnya beginning in 
2005. 
 
B. THE LOCALIZATION EXPLANATION 
Figure 6 depicted a commonality in the trajectory of the insurgencies in Chechnya 
and Mindanao. In Mindanao, Figure 6 still applies today. However, the two situations 
ended up diverging. Figure 7 depicts how Russia used localization to alter the course of the 
insurgency, forcing the trajectory of the Chechen insurgency to change in a way different 
from the Philippine case. 
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Russia’s localization of the counterinsurgency induced a split in the insurgency, ultimately 
changing the insurgency from conflict between Russia and Chechnya to a conflict between 
Chechnya and the insurgents. 
Figure 7.  Effect of localization on the Chechen insurgency. 
Just as the Russian military reached a virtual stalemate prior to the full 
implementation of the localization strategy, the Philippine counterinsurgency appears to 
have reached a similar point of diminishing military returns. The AFP and other security 
forces routinely target insurgent leaders and achieve tactical successes, but there is little 
indication that the insurgent threat from ISIS-linked groups in Mindanao is diminishing. 
While the transformation of the insurgency from an ethno-nationalist insurgency to a 
radical Pan-Islamic insurgency poses significant challenges to the GRP, it may also present 
an opportunity. In Chechnya, the permeation of outside influences within the insurgency 
began to degrade the insurgency’s widespread popular support. When Russia localized the 
counterinsurgency, it reframed the entire conflict, effectively facilitating a split between 
the insurgency and Chechen populace. This “Chechenization” of the conflict also deepened 
a rift within the insurgency itself, driving numerous insurgents to the side of the Chechen 
government. The GRP could potentially take advantage of a similar situation in Mindanao. 
While the MNLF and MILF garnered the enthusiastic support of the populace in certain 
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areas of Mindanao, the current crop of ISIS-affiliated insurgent groups do not enjoy high 
levels of popular support. However, a local populace that does not support an insurgency 
is very different from a local populace that actively works against an insurgency. If the 
GRP can successfully turn over counterinsurgency functions to empowered local leaders, 
then it may be able to better exploit a rift between the insurgency and society than it has 
been able to accomplish until now. Also, as in the case of Chechnya, such a strategy is 
likely to push the counterinsurgency past the point of stalemate by pressuring and 
degrading insurgent groups beyond what the AFP alone has achieved. 
The Philippines has certain unique characteristics that could pose obstacles to true 
counterinsurgency localization, and the GRP would undoubtedly find a Chechenization-
type of strategy in Mindanao to be challenging. First, unlike Chechnya, Mindanao has 
significant ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. For this reason, it is highly unlikely 
that the GRP would be able to install a single, Kadyrov-like figure through whom the GRP 
could prosecute counterinsurgency functions by proxy. The chance of such a figure 
achieving legitimacy among all the various groups is small.344 The GRP would probably 
have to coopt multiple local leaders to carry out its objectives in all the areas affected by 
the insurgency. 
On the other hand, many of the insurgent-infested areas already contain armed 
groups, such as the MILF, that are not currently in a state of conflict with the GRP. The 
MILF has distanced itself from the Abu Sayyaf and denounced terrorism. Also, the MILF 
has clashed with ISIS-linked groups within its territory,345 even receiving limited support 
from the AFP.346 Given these circumstances, the MILF appears to be a promising target 
for cooption as part of a GRP localization strategy. Although this thesis argued that formal 
ratification of the GRP-MILF peace agreement by the Philippine legislature would not 
                                                 
344 Despite attempts to establish a Moro identity that would unify the Muslims of the Southern 
Philippines, ethnic and tribal identity has generally kept the Moro identity from becoming more than a 
loosely unifying force. 
345 Agence France-Presse, “10 MILF Fighters Dead in Clashes with ISIS-linked Groups, August 23, 
2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/179780-moro-islamic-liberation-front-isis-alarm-philippines. 
346 Francis Wakefield and Agence France-Presse, “Gov’t Troops Join Forces with MILF in Fighting 
IS-inspired BIFF,” September 7, 2017, https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/09/07/govt-troops-join-forces-with-
milf-in-fighting-is-inspired-biff/. 
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meaningfully impact the overall counterinsurgency, such an agreement could possibly 
facilitate counterinsurgency localization efforts by helping foster the level of trust 
necessary for the GRP to turn over counterinsurgency functions to the MILF. 
C. POSSIBLE PREREQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR LOCALIZATION 
Analysis of Russia’s Chechenization strategy also identifies a set of conditions that 
likely must be met for counterinsurgency localization to be effective. The first of these 
conditions is a split between the insurgency and the local populace. The second is a split 
between local elites, with one set of elites supporting the insurgency and the other set 
opposing it. It appears probable that one or both of these conditions are necessary to 
facilitate localization, whether the conditions are provoked as part of a counterinsurgency 
strategy or occur through other stimuli. In the Chechnya case, Russia helped create both 
conditions, a split between the populace and the insurgency through information warfare 
and a split between elites through the cooption of the Kadyrovs. In the early days of the 
First Chechen War and prior to the qualitative shift depicted in Figure 6, these conditions 
did not exist, and it is difficult to envision localization as a feasible strategy then.  
Likewise, neither condition existed in Mindanao during the ethno-nationalist phase 
of insurgency. When the MNLF and MILF were the face of the insurgency, no local entity 
existed in insurgent-infested areas with whom the GRP could turn over counterinsurgency 
functions and have a reasonable expectation that that entity would work toward the GRP’s 
interests. At that point in the history of the conflict, a localization strategy would have been 
a poor strategy. The evidence shows that the GRP ultimately employed the correct strategy 
during the ethno-nationalist phase, using military force and political accommodation to 
achieve peace with the MNLF and MILF. However, considering that the new insurgent 
groups do not seek any accommodation other than being recognized as an Islamic State 
under the global Caliphate, the GRP needs a different approach. The current Pan-Islamic 
insurgency in Mindanao has little support from the local populace, and the local power 
brokers, such as the leadership of the MILF, either passively or actively oppose the ISIS-
linked insurgent groups. With these two conditions met, localization becomes a more 
logical approach and likely to produce similar results as in Chechnya. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis suggests neither that Russia conducted a perfect counterinsurgency nor 
implies that the Chechen counterinsurgency is a model counterinsurgency that should be 
emulated in every way. However, the numerous similarities between the situation in 
Chechnya and the situation in Mindanao make the Chechen case a valuable tool for 
comparative study. In addition, Russia’s ultimate success in ending the Chechen 
counterinsurgency makes the Chechnya case useful for examining the factors that led to 
that success and how they may apply to the Philippines.  
A comparison of the application of the hypotheses to the Russian counterinsurgency 
and the Philippine counterinsurgency reveals a sharp contrast in how Russia and the GRP 
applied the principle of localization to their counterinsurgency efforts. While Russia’s 
localization strategy produced dramatic results and arguably constituted the single most 
important factor in its eventual counterinsurgency success, the GRP has notably failed to 
implement localization in a meaningful way in Mindanao. The evidence from case studies 
of the Philippines and Chechnya supports the inference that the GRP’s failure to localize 
the counterinsurgency following the transformation of the insurgency into a fractured, 
global jihad-linked conflict is a significant causal factor in the GRP’s failure to achieve 
ultimate success thus far, despite successfully ending the MNLF and MILF-led 
insurgencies.  
The result of this study has two implications for counterinsurgency efforts in 
Mindanao. First, although the current insurgency is linked with and grew out of the 
previous phases of insurgency, it must be recognized as having changed in its structure and 
objectives. As such, counterinsurgency planners must look at the Mindanao insurgency 
holistically rather than simply as combating a specific, named organization and must 
understand that the methods and the strategies that were effective in previous phases of the 
insurgency will not achieve the same results in the current conflict. Second, the importance 
of localization should be recognized. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies comprise a 
highly complex system, and this thesis does not naively suggest that any single factor 
provides a “silver bullet” that guarantees success. However, the Chechen case demonstrates 
that a strategy based upon counterinsurgency localization can effectively turn around a 
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stalled counterinsurgency; therefore, the implementation of a localization strategy in 
Mindanao is worth consideration. 
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